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The question of sovereignty over Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu
(the Pescadores),' avoided for nearly thirty years, can no longer be
deferred, for the radical shifts and sudden realignments in Far Eastern
politics have thrust the controverted status of the island-state into the
political foreground.2 The international legal issue has been joined
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1. Unless otherwise specified, Taiwan includes Penghu (the Pescadorcs) and the
other isles of the Taiwan archipelagic system, and is used interchangeably with Formosa.
The island of Taiwan was better known internationally as Formosa in both governmental
and popular usage. For example, Formosa, not Taiwan, was used in the Cairo Declaration
of 1943, 9 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 393 (1943), the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. 13 id. 137
(1945), the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.IA.S. No.
2490, and the Formosa Resolution adopted by the United States Congress in 1955, H.J.
Res. 159, 69 Stat. 7 (Jan. 29, 1955). It was in the late 1950's, when proposals for "one
China, one Formosa" were put forward, that the Nationalist Chinese regime became
very insistent on using Taiwan instead of Formosa. The Nationalist Chinese elite sent
to be opposed to the usage of Formosa primarily because: (1) Formosa, Portuguese in
origin, tends to connote the non-Chinese legacy of the Taiwanese people; (2) Formosa
underscores the fact that Taiwan's international legal status remains undetermined; and
(3) Formosa has been closely identified with the Formosan independence movement.
Thus, there was a conspicuous shift in changing Formosa to Taiwan in the 1960's, both
in governmental and non-governmental circles.
2. See generally L. CHEN & H. LAsSWELL, FOoS.. CHINA. AND THE UNITED NATIONS
(1967) [hereinafter cited as CHEN & LAsSWELL]; IV. BUE.LER, U.S. CHINA POLICY AND TILE
PROBLF-M OF TAIWAN (1971); D. MENDEL, THE POLITICS OF FotosAN NATIoNALtS.%t (1970);
G. KERR, FontosA BETRAYED (1965); FoiiosA TODAY (M. Mancall ed. 1964); L. CnEN,
TAi-wAN E TOK-LIP KAP RAN-KoK (The Independence and Nation-Building of Taiwan)
(1971); J. COHEN, E. FimDmAN, H. HiNrro. & A. WHmNG, TAIWAN AND AsEssuc.AN POUCY
(1971); A. BARNETT, A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA (1971); R. Moonsren & M.
ABRAmOwITz, REMAKING CHINA POLICY (1971); Hearings on fhe United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Republic of China, Before the Subcomm. on
United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on the United States Relations
with the People's Republic of China Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings on the United States-China Relations: A Strategy
for the Future Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Bueler, Taiwan: A Problem of International
Law or Politics?, 30 WORLD TODAY 255 (1971); Cohen, Recognizing China 50 FoREI.n
AYFAis 30 (1971); Ravenal, Approaching China, Defending Taiwan, id. at 44.
Regarding the controversy over Taiwan's international legal status, see CHEN & LAmvEL,
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over the sufficiency of China's claim to the islands. Despite an inter-
vening civil and domestic ideological war, that claim has been re-
markably consistent, whether pressed by adherents of the Nationalist
or Communist cause.3 Indeed, Nationalist and Communist Chinese
supra at 82-140; 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 477-591 (1964) [herein-
after cited as WHITEMAN DIGEST]; J. COHEN, E. FRIEDMAN, H. HINTON & A. WHITING,
supra at 156-77; Dai, Recognition of States and Governments under International Law
With Special Reference to Canadian Postwar Practice and the Legal Status of Taiwan
(Formosa), 3 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 290 (1965); Harvey, The Legal Status of Formosa,
30 WORLD AFFAIRS Q. 134 (1959); Jain, The Legal Status of Formosa, 57 Am. J. INT'L L.
25 (1963); Kirkham, The International Legal Status of Formosa, 6 CANADIAN Y.B, INT'L
L. 144 (1968). See also F. MORFLLo, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF FORMOSA (196?;
O'Connell, The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem, 50 Am. 1. INTL
L. 403 (1956); Phillips, The International Legal Status of Formosa, 10 WESTERN POL. Q.
276 (1957); Wright, The Chinese Recognition Problem, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 318 (1955).
We do not address ourselves to the question of the status of Quemoy and Matsu,
offshore islets of the Chinese mainland. China's title, it is generally agreed, seems quite
unclouded there. In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles drew a sharp distinction
between the status of Formosa and the Pescadores, as opposed to that of Quemoy and
Matsu. For the text of the statement, see pp. 644-45 infra. Distinguishinu Formosa from the
offshore islands (Quemoy and Matsu), Mr. Lester Pearson, then Minister of External
Affairs, made clear the Canadian position on January 25, 1955, in 'the following terms:
In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made be-
tween the position of Formosa and the Pescadores and the islands off the China coast
now in Nationalist hands: the latter are indisputably part of the territory of China;
the former Formosa and the Pescadores which were Japanese colonies for fifty years
prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that are not.
Pearson, Statement of the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, 26 CURRENT NOTES ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 56, 57 (1955). A similar view was also expressed by the Aus.
tralian government. See Casey, Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, id. at 127,
176. For a survey of other viewpoints, see pp. 644-47 infra.
The total area of the fourteen Quemoy islets is sixty-nine square miles. Matsu consists
of nineteen islets whose total land area is merely 10.5 square miles. The shortest distance
from Quemoy to the Mainland Chinese territory is 1.44 miles, from Quemoy to Formosa
(Kaoshung) it is 174.9 miles. Quemoy and Matsu have a total civilian population of
67,000. The total military population, is, of course, a matter of strict secrecy, but is
estimated at around 150,000. On the specific question of Quemoy and Matsu, see gen.
erally D. CoP' & M. PECK, THE ODD DAY (1962); Lewis, Quemoy and American-China
Policy, 2 ASIAN SURVEY 12 (1962); Tsou, The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and
the United States, 12 WESTERN POL. Q. 1075 (1959); Clubb, Formosa and the Offshore
Islands in American Policy, 1950-55, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 517 (1959); Tsou, Mao's Limited War
in the Taiwan Strait, 3 ORBIS 332 (1959).
3. For the Communist Chinese position, see THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTTE OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OPPOSE U.S. OCCUPATION OF TAIWAN AND "TWo CHINAS" PLOT (1958);
IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN (Foreign Language Press
ed. 1955); China's Sovereignty over Taiwan Brooks No Intervention, People's Da ly, May
12, 1964, reprinted in PEKING REV., May 15, 1964, at 6-8; The Chinese People are De-
termined to Liberate Taiwan, People's Daily, June 27, 1965, reprinted in PEKING REV.,
July 2, 1965, at 9-10. For the most recent statements, see Interview with Chou En-lal,
BULL. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, Summer-Fall 1971, at 31, 43-44; Official Transcript
of James Reston's Conversation with the Chinese Premier in Peking, N.Y. Times, Aug.
10, 1971, at 14, cols. 2-3; id., Aug. 6, 1971, at 1, col. 2; id, Nov. 10, 1971, at 17, col. 1;
Midnight Thoughts of Premier Chou, The Sunday Times (London), Dec. 5, 1971, at 4.5.
See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1971, at 1, col. 8 and at 16, col. 3; PEKING REV., Nov. 19,
1971, at 5-9; Renmin Ribao, Commentator, Fresh Evidence of U.S. Government's Hos-
tility Toward Chinese People, PEKING REV., May 7, 1971, at 13-17; Flagrantly Pushing
"Two Chinas" Plot, id., Aug. 6, 1971, at 26-27; Renmin Ribao, Commentator, Resolutely
Oppose U.S. Scheme of Creating "Two Chinas," id., Sept. 30, 1971, at 5-6; A Victory for
World's People: Crushing Defeat for U.S. Imperialism, id., Oct. 29, 1971, at 6-9.
The Nationalist view on the issue was expressed annually before the General Assembly
during the debates on the Chinese participation question. See also President Chiang
Kai-shek's address on February 8, 1955 in FIt= CHINA REV., March 1955, at 49-54, Lni-Wu
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share an identity of interest here: Nationalist China has supported
Communist China's pretensions to territory,4 while Peking has con-
firmed Nationalist aspirations, if only to claim benefit as the suc-
cessor state.5
I. International Decision and the Control of Territory
Territorial organization has had a slower metabolism of change in
international law than the movements of peoples and the fashions
of ideology and legal theory. A comparatively high degree of stability
for political boundaries has been considered necessary for effective
resource exploitation and, more generally, for the continuing viability
of an international political system organized primarily in territorial,
nation-state units. Hence the tendency of international decision
makers to sustain through time an almost stereotypic stability in ter-
ritorial control, despite the often discordant anachronism between
such holdings and current political myth and social reality.0
HAN, TAWAN TODAY 1-25 (1951); LIN WFE, Wo-.txr. TE TAI-WAN (Our Tah,,an) (195).
For a most recent statement, see Tan, Representation of China in the United Nations,
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 1971, Am. J. LNT'L L., Vol. 65,
No. 4, 1971, at 20-25.
But for the contrary view on the part of Formosans, see YtZIN CHLAoroNG No, His-
TORICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN (ForcOS) (1971);
Chen, Legal Status of Formosa, 4 PHILIPPINE INT'L L.J. 99 (1965); Ko. The Legal Status
of Formosa from the Viewpoint of International Law, I Fora. Ios..N Q. 37 (1962); Li, The
China Impasse: A Formosan View, 36 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 437 (1958).
4. Aside from the identical territorial claim to Taiwan, both Nationalist China and
Communist China have taken the same territorial position with regard to the Sino-Indian
border disputes, the status of Tibet, and the title over the Senkaku islands (Tiao Yu Tai
islands).
5. Since the People's Republic of China has never had control and jurisdiction over
Taiwan, its claim to Taiwan is in large part based on the theor)' that it is a successor
to the "benefits" belonging to the "Republic of China." Implicit in Peking's claim is
that, by defeating the Nationalist Chinese regime headed by Chiang Kai-shek, it auto-
matically inherits all that belonged to "the Republic of China." For a disctssion of
which China, Nationalist or Communist, is to be considered the original China, see
McDougal & Goodman, Chinese Participation in the United Nations, 60 Am. J. IT'%L L.
671, 699-718 (1966).
6. An extremely recent example of this trend is provided by the Temple of Prcah
Vihear case. The International Court there said that
[i]n general, when two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the
primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if the line so
established can at any moment, and on the basis of a continuously available process,
be called in question, and its rectification claimed, whenever any inaccuracy by
reference to a clause in the parent treaty is discovered. Such a process could continue
indefinitely, and finality would never be reached so long as possible errors still
remained to be discovered. Such a frontier, so far from being stable, should be
completely precarious.
Temple of Preah Vihear Case, [1962] I.C.J. 6, 34. On the other hand, the court has
manifested flexibility in fixing outer limits for territorial waters. See Anglo.Norwegian
Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116. See also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
591, 639 (1846). For a policy analysis of these problems, see M. Rms.IA., NULLrn" AND
REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDCGENT5-rs AND Awrms
245-47 (1971).
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Four novel international factors now challenge this older pattern
of decision:
First, international decision has been increasingly homocentric
rather than state-centered. The change, manifested in the prolifera-
tion of human rights norms and, more diffusely, in international
public policies of human rights, has had a direct impact on the law
of territorial sovereignty.7 The transformation of a monarch's "estate,"
devolving through varying systems of geniture and legacy, to a nation-
state, deemed the common patrimony of the people and not of a
single owner, implied basic changes in determining ownership or
title. As the notion of "people" shed its penumbral mysticism and
was related with greater clarity to an aggregate of individuals, the
wishes of this group came to be recognized as a particularly salient
factor in determining title. The development is not yet complete,
but its necessary contours are now apparent.
Second, the doctrine of jus cogens has achieved an international
consensus.8 A jus cogens or peremptory norm is a fundamental norma-
tive demand in a legal system which operates to override any con-
travening arrangement or practice but cannot itself be changed or
terminated other than by inclusive community procedures. Over the
long run, peremptory norms serve as unifying and stabilizing factors
within an authority system. Nonetheless, tensions can result when
they require changes or reconstructions in social situations estab-
7. The relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter are: the preamble; art. 1(2) and (3);
art. 55; art. 56; ch. XI; ch. XV. Of the various human rights conventions, see in par,
ticular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (1966), and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966), in U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 32/4 (1967). See also BASIC DOCUMENTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (L Brownlie ed. 1971).
The literature chronicling this major development in international policy is, of
course, vast. On the international protection of human rights, see generally J. CARLY°,
U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1970); A. DEL Russo, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1971); M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1962); H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1945); H.
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); M. MOsKOwiTz, Tile POL-
ITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1968); E. SciwERL, HUMAN RIGHITS AND TilE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1964); V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGtHTS, TIlE UNITED STATES,
AND WORLD COMMUNITY (1970); UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1968); UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, BIRTH1.
RIGHT OF MAN (1969); INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGIITS (A. Eide &- A. Schou
eds. 1968); THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (E. Luard ed. 1967); Mc-
Dougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for
Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969).
8. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27
(1969). See also CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE. TUE CONCEPT Or JUg
COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (1967); Schwelb, Some Aspects
of International Jus Cogens, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946 (1967). But cf. G. SCIIWARZENIIERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 27 et seq. (1971).
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lished before the emergence of the peremptory norm. Such tensions
may prove extremely acute in territorial arrangements contravening a
jus cogens. Hence much legal ingenuity will be required in designing
transitional regimes which achieve change with minimum sacrifice
of public order and value use.
Third, the world community has established an international or-
ganization whose authority is plenary in cases of a "threat to the
peace." While it would be misleading to speak of a right of inter-
national eminent domain, there can be no question of the competence
of the United Nations Security Council and, in appropriate circum-
stances, the General Assembly, to initiate and supervise territorial
revisions when in the view of the organization this would best secure
minimum world order.10 Institutional patterns of inter-state collabora-
tion also provide a degree of effective power which can be mobilized
by a central organization. This new potential competence changes
the dynamics of the international regime of title.
Fourth, a global economy has emerged and in many ways has
changed, indeed made obsolete, continuing political structures. A
common feature of the contemporary world is the proliferation of
territorial and non-territorial groups which are politically discrete
but factually integrated. Any type of solidaritd social generates com-
plex authority demands in which the interests of an interdependent
whole require changes in the activities of component parts." One
consequence of increasing global interdependence is that territorial
claims, like other assertions, may often be challenged by claims of
common economic or other interest.12
The introduction of these new dynamic factors raises fascinating
"intertemporal" questions. The legal time-space frame of a territorial
9. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39. In cases in which the plenary powers of the Security
Council prove inoperable, a secondary. contingent competence of the General Assembly
for the maintenance of peace comes into operation: G.A. Res. 377. 5 U.N. GAOR Supp.
20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). See also Certain Expenses Case. [1962] IC.J. 151.
10. Since the interests of the general community must precede those of component
members and since the primary function of the United Nations is the maintenance of
international minimum order without which no other objective can be fulfilled, the
appropriate organ of the U.N. must have a competence to introduce territorial changes
in those circumstances in which such changes promise the most economic and just means
for maintaining or restoring the peace, U.N. CHARTER art. 2(41). notwithstanding. Ob-
viously, such a competence would be used sparingly, since a coordinate goal of the
organization is the maintenance of the territorial integrity of member states.
11. For judicial recognition of this process, see Advisry Opinion on Tunis Morocco
Nationality Decrees, [1923] P.C.IJ., ser. B, No. 4. at 23.24.
12. See C. JENrs, LAw, FREEDom AND WVELFARE 71-82 (1963); .M. McDOL'GAL. H. LsmWE.
9- I. VLAsic, LAw AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 134-37 (1963); R. FALK, Titts ENOAxrE.ED
PLANEr (1971).
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regime is often different from the culturally conditioned time-space
frames of participants in a changing social process. Virtually every
controversy over territory involves one or more past claims, allegedly
perfected in periods during which different substantive and procedural
norms were in force.13 Hence every authoritative response to a claim
of international title must apply a set of intertemporal principles,
balancing (1) patterns of resource use inherited from the past and
shaped by prescriptions which may no longer be in force or which
may now be repugnant to contemporary demands but which, none-
theless, condition some contemporary expectations and the good faith
value investments made thereon, with (2) claims for resource use
conforming to contemporary norms. Because the public order system
puts a premium on stability and the avoidance of disruptions in re-
source use, a delicate balance must be struck in each case. Optimum
decisions must invent programs for applying policies in each idiosyn-
cratic case, sustaining minimum order as well as approximating what-
ever happen to be the contemporary demands for preferred public
order.
We note five general intertemporal principles relevant to the regime
of international legal title:
1. Unless a challenge to territorial title has been lodged, a pre-
sumption of local prescriptive and applicative competence and of
valid title is enjoyed by those acting under color of authority, in
all legal international activities.' 4
2. In cases of direct or ancillary challenge, there is a strong pre-
sumption in favor of upholding perfected titles from the past,
which have been held effectively and continuously to the pres-
ent.yt
3. If, however, such title runs contrary to a peremptory inter-
national norm (jus cogens) which has since emerged, decision-
13. See M. REISMAN, THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE 3-9 (1970).
14. A challenge over time may, of course, act to bar consolidation or perfection of
a claimed title. Nonetheless, the general principle of law common to almost all legal
systems accords a presumption of ownership to the possessor, as a means of maintaining
stability for value exploitation. In international law, the presumption extends to a gen-
eral prescriptive and applicative competence. See Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.1.J1,
ser. A, No. 9. The principle comes closest to express doctrinal formulation in the Latin
American regional practice of uti possidetis. The Roman doctrine from which uti Pos-
sidetis was allegedly derived was a Praetorian edict ordering parties to refrain from
seeking to change possession of property while the question of its title was being
litigated.
15. See Temple of Preah Vihear Case, [1962] I.C.J. 116, 130. Also pertinent is the
famous dictum in the Grisbadarna case: "[I]t is a settled principle of the law of nations
that a state of things which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be
changed as little as possible .... ." Grisbadarna Case (Norway v. Sweden), HAGUE CoURT
REPoRTs (Scott) 121, 130 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909).
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makers will require modifications in the challenged title to bring
it into conformity with contemporary law.10
4. Inchoate titles from the past which remain unperfected and
which are challenged in the present must perfect themselves in
conformity with contemporary law. Claimants cannot seek to
perfect title under earlier, superseded norms, even though part
of title pro futuro may rest on such obsolesced norms.17
5. In circumstances in which prior title has lapsed or no inter-
national title has ever been established, a title to territory can
only be established in conformity with the fundamental postu-
lates of contemporary international law. These include not only
peremptory norms (jus cogens) but all other authoritative prin-
ciples of procedure and content relevant to the establishment
of a territorial community.
18
Inevitably, the application of these principles and the dynamics
of territorial control in the world political process result in a legal
16. Note the distinction between title to territory and treaty rights in general. In
regard to treaties in general, a jus cogens subsequens and a jus cogens emergcns will
render unlawful pro Juturo a treaty regime which was lawful until the intervention of
the new peremptory norm. See also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
53, supra note 8. The gradualistic tone of LEAGuE OF NAIo.s COVE'CANT art. 20 indicates
the social and political difficulties which such changes entail and may be compared with
U.N. CHARTER art. 103, which vaults the parties by directing decdsionaers to give
supremacy to the Charter in cases in which its provisions conflict with treaty provisions.
In regard to territorial regimes, in contrast, a subsequent peremptory norm will not
eo ipso nullify a title which vested under norms formerly lawful but now discredited by
a new jus cogens. However, if title is challenged, decisionmakers will be obliged to take
account of the contemporary jus cogens which now mandates them. This is precisely the
meaning of jus cogens. However, they may not re-examine the lawfulness of the title in
terms of normative changes which do not involve peremptory norms. Some aspects of
these problems are intimated in Judge Huber's award in Island of Palmas Case (United
States v. Netherlands), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928). A sensitive examination of many
of the problems which Palmas raises in this regard is found in Jessup, The Palmas
Island Arbitration, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 735 (1928).
17. In contrast to our third principle, see pp. 604-05 supra, a title which did not vest
or one which remained "inchoate" must perfect itself under contemporaneous norms
rather than under the superseded norms. See, e.g., Delagoa Bay Case, 3 G. DE MART.NS,
NouvEAu RECUEIL GENERAL DE TRArrr.s 517 (2d Ser. 1878); 5 J. 'MooRE, IN ^TNA AL
ARBnrrRAToNs 4984 (1878), and Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), 2
U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
18. The proposition requires little illumination. New acts take effect under contempo-
raneous law. The distinction between principles four and five is that in five, all com-
ponents of an older regime have obsolesced whereas, in four, parts of it continue to be
legally effective. Consider the following hypothetical example. An atoll in the Pacific
which is inhabitable was discovered and claimed by France in 1938, but French inten-
tions of occupying it were postponed by the outbreak of the war. It is arguable that
France acquires an "inchoate title" for a reasonable period of time (see note 93 infra)
though perfection of title in 1946 must take account of the law as of that date and
cannot rely on the somewhat more lenient standards which might have applied in 1938.
In contrast, if an inhabitable atoll which is thrust above the waves by volcanic activity
in 1949 is claimed by the United States, any. title which the United States secures is
based only on international law as of 1949. A third example is of an atoll occupied and
administered by France for fifty years, at the end of which time it is abandoned as a
matter of intention and fact. Thereafter, the Soviet Union moves to secure title over it.
Soviet title must fulfill the title requirements of international law in 1972 and not
any of those in effect in 1922, at the time when France occupied the atoll.
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patchwork of dramatic temporal disjunctions and applications, side
by side, of laws from entirely different time periods with only jagged
approximations to contemporary demands for justice. 1 Much of
this melange is attributable to the social and economic need for sta-
bility as well as to the rather haphazard, disorganized and often dys-
functional way in which challenges to international title are brought
to the attention of international decisionmakers. 20 Thus, much that
is desirable cannot be expected from the regime of international terri-
torial control. While the regime must contribute, in its own sphere,
to improvement of international public order, it is only one instru-
ment for amelioration. A wide range of other international legal
modalities are available which may, in certain circumstances, be more
economical and effective. This does not, of course, discharge the law
of territorial sovereignty from its own responsibility to world public
order.
II. Historical Perspective
Taiwan (Formosa) is an island about 110 miles off the southeast
coast of mainland China.21 With a population of fifteen million, the
19. Thus, one may find three contiguous states, one of which has secured title by
conquest, another by prescription and the third by secession and self-determination. At
a subsequent instant in time, only the third means of acquisition would have been lawful
under international law if title were to be secured at that moment. Nonetheless, all of
the three titles would be recognized if they had been perfected in periods in the past
during which each particular means of acquisition sufficed.
20. On the general problem of invocation, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 403, 426-29
(1967).
21. Taiwan is about 700 miles south of Japan and 200 miles north of Luzon, the
Philippines. The Pescadores (Penghu) consist of sixty-four isles, covering some fifty
square miles. See Pi, A Try on the Explanation About the Local Name of the Pescadores
[sic], TAIWAN WEN SIHuN (Report of Historic Geographical Studies on Taiwan), vol. 21,
No. 2, 1970, at 22-28. In addition, there are thirteen adjacent islets (of which only
six are inhabited) surrounding Taiwan proper. Regarding the geographical and physical
features of Taiwan, see generally the excellent comprehensive study by CIIENC.-SIANG
CH'EN, T'AIVAN TI-CHIH (A Geography of Taiwan) (1959-61) (three vols.) (hereinafter
cited as CH'EN]. See also CHENG-SIANG CH'EN, PENGCHIAYU (The Agincourt Island) (1954);
C. HsIEH, TAIWAN-ILHA FORMOSA (1964); Ch'en, The Geographical Change of Taiwan si
the Past Three Hundred Years, TAIWAN WEN SmEN, vol. 12, No. 1, 1954, at 67-92; Wu,
A Study on Ryuchiu Yu, TAIWAN WEN SHEN, vol. 20, No. 3, 1969, at 1-44.
Tiao-yu Tai, known in Japanese as the Senkaku islands, have recently assumed major
importance after geological surveys indicated that the area is rich in oil deposits.
Japanese, Communist Chinese, Nationalist Chinese and Taiwanese all claim ownership
of the islands. Taiwanese and Chinese dispute Japan's claim that they are part of the
Ryukyu Islands which are to be returned to Japan in May 1972. See N.Y. Times, Dec, 6,
1970, at 32, col. 3; id., Jan. 30, 1971, a t 8, col. 3; id., June 13, 1971, at 7, col. 1; Editorial,
The Senkaku Islands Deal-A Diplomatic Sell-Out, THE INDEPENDENT FORMOSA, Winter
1970, at 2; Editorial, Our Position with Regard to the Tiao-yu Tai Islets, TAIWAN
CHENGLIAN, May 1971, at 5-6. See also Hearings on Okinawa Reversion Treaty Before the
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island-state has more people than ninety-seven of the 132 member
states of the United Nations.22 The Taiwanese, with the solid indus-
trial foundation laid by the Japanese before the end of World War II
and the massive inflow of post-war economic aid (totalling $1.5 bil-
lion from 1950 to 1965),23 have created an economically self-sustaining
and viable entity. Taiwan was never integrated into the economy of
the mainland of China and since the Communist revolution, the island-
state, having had no economic contact with China, has developed an
economic system completely distinct and different from its neighbor.
As a result, Taiwan's economy is a part of the aggregate market
economy of the non-communist world.2 4 In general, comparisons of
China and Taiwan are instructive. Taiwan has fifteen million people
and an area of less than 14,000 square miles while mainland China has
800 million people and an area of 3.7 million square miles. Yet Tai-
wan's annual external trade is $4 billion, the same as China's.2 While
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Annex to Hearings on
Okinawa Reversion Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
22. As of July 1971, Taiwan's population was 14,852,882. DmEcronATE.GE.inAL OF
BUDGETS, ACCOUNTS & STATISTICS, EXECUTIVE YUAN, IoxTHLY STATISTICS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, Aug. 1971, at 10-11. Of this number, approximately thirteen million are
Taiwanese, i.e., born in Taiwan. The remainder are, for the most part, malnlanders
who came to Taiwan after 1949. For a historical survey concerning the change of Taian's
population, see 2 T'At-Wl.&N SHENG WEN HStEN WEI YUAN HUEi, TAi-wAN SIIENG TUNG
CHIH KAO: ZEN MIN CHIH, ZEN KOU PIANG (The General History of Taiwan Province: People,
Population) (1964).
23. For a comprehensive appraisal of the effects of US. aid to Taiwan. see N. JAconY,
US. Am To TAIWAN: A STUDY OF FOREIGN Am, SELF-HELP. AND DEVELOPIENTr (1966).
Concerning Taiwan's recent economic growth, see OFFICE OF ECONOMIc RESEARCH, BANK
OF TAIWAN, T'AI-WAN CHIN-CHI HUA-TSAN CHIH YEN.CHIU (A Study of Taiwan's Economic
Development) (1970); T. SHEN, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ON TAIWAN SINCE WOMD WAn
II (1964); ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN (K. Chang ed. 1958). For Taiwan's eco-
nomic development during Japanese rule, see G. BARCLAY, COLO.NIAL DEVELOPMENTF AND
POPULATION IN TAIWAN (1954).
Official sources of statistics concerning Taiwan's economy include INDusmY oF FnEz
CHINA (a monthly in both English and Chinese, published by the Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (published annually
in both English and Chinese by the Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts, and
Statistics, Executive Yuan); TAIWAN STATISTICAL DATA BooK (published annually by the
Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development, Executive Yuan).
Other valuable sources are: UNrrE NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMSSION FOR ASIA AND THE
FAR EASr, ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR AsIA AND THE FAR EAST (published in Bangkok); FAn
EASTERN ECONOMIC REvIEW (published in Hong Kong). A series of Taiwan Studies (in
Chinese) published by the Bank of Taiwan offer the most scholarly analysis available on
the island of Taiwan's economy.
24. International investment in Taiwan, particularly by Japanese and Americans, is
quite substantial. See J. SCHREIBER, UNITED STATES CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN
(1970).
25. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 39, col. I, and at 40, col. 1 (city ed.). Regarding the
import-export trade of Taiwan, see CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS, TIlE TRADE OF CHINA
(TAIWAN), 1970 (compiled and published by Statistical Dep't, Inspectomte General of
Customs, 1971). As regards Mainland China's foreign trade, see A. ECrIN, CoMmustsT
CHINA'S ECONOMIC GRoWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE (1966).
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size and economic viability do not automatically vindicate a claim to
separate statehood under international law, they do establish the
factual plausibility of such a claim. 20
The striking political and economic distinctions between China
and Taiwan are not of recent vintage. Historically, the relations be-
tween the two states were intermittent and, for the most part, quite
tenuous. While it is uncertain whence the first inhabitants came to
Taiwan, its first natives were aborigines of Malay stock.21 The island
was originally known by the Chinese as Liu Ch'iu, and was probably
regarded by the Chinese emperors as a tributary similar to Thailand
(Siam), Nepal, Burma, Vietnam (Annam), Laos, Korea and other
foreign lands.2
8
In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, dissident Chinese
began to cross the 110-mile Formosa Straits and settle in Taiwan in
substantial numbers. When, in the seventeenth century, the Dutch
and Spanish established settlements in Taiwan, Imperial China was
neither disposed nor able to prevent them. Based in Taiwan, the
Dutch East India Company controlled and exploited the southern
coast of the island for about forty years.2
26. Regarding Taiwan's value-institutional development and viability as compared
to other countries, see B. RussETr, H. ALKER, K. DEUTSCH, & H. LASSWELL, WORLD HAND-
BOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (1964). See also CHEN & LASSWELL, supra note 2,
at 399-418.
27. See C. CHAr, TAIWAN ABORIGINES; A GENETIC STUDY OF TRIBAL VARIATIONS (1967);
2 CH'EN, supra note 21, at 27, 909-1010 (1960). For the early history of Formosa, see
generally W. CAMPBELL, FORMOSA UNDER THE DUTCH (1903); W. CAMPBELL, SKETCHES FROM
FORMOSA (1915); J. DAVIDSON, THE ISLAND OF FORMOSA, PASr AND PRESENT (1903), W.
PICKERING, PIONEERING IN FORMOSA: RECOLLECTIONS OF ADVENTURES AMONG MANDARINS,
WRECKERS, & HEAD-HUNTING SAVAGES (1898). A classic in Chinese, HENG LIEN, TAI-WAN
T'UNG-SHIH (The General History of Taiwan), first published in 1921, was reprinted by
the Committee of Chinese Collections, Taipei, in 1955.
For a brief account of Formosa's history by a Nationalist official (former Minister of
Education), see CHI-YUN CHANG, AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF TAIWAN (1953). See also CtiUN.
CHANG CHIANG, T'AI-WAN LI-SHIH KAI-YAU (A General History of Taiwan) (1970); TING.I
Kuo, T'AI-WAN SHIH-SHIH KAI-SHUO (A General History of Taiwan) (2d ed. 1958).
For an account by a Communist Chinese, see CHIH-FU LI, TAI-WAN JEN-MIN KOMING
TOU-CHENG CHIEN-SHIH (A Brief History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Taiwanese
People) (1955).
Formosans' perspectives about their past are comprehensively presented by: JOKTIK ONo,
TAIWAN: KUMON SURU SONO REKISHI (Taiwan: Its Agonizing History) (1964); ME! Sll,
TAIWANJIN YONHYAKUNENSHI (The Four Hundred Year History of the Taiwanese) (1962);
YUNGH-SIANG LAI, TAIWAN SHIH YEN-CHIU (Studies on History of Taiwan), series 1 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as LAI].
28. Cf. NG, supra note 3, at 16-22; Fairbank & Teng, On the Ch'ing Tributary System,
6 HARV. J. ASIATIC STUDIES 135 (1941); THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER: TRADITIONAL CHINA'S
FOREIGN RELATIONS (J. Fairbank ed. 1968). For a bibliography concerning the debate on
Taiwan's original name, Liu Chiu, see Y. LAI, supra note 27, at 227-30,
29. See W. CAMPBELL, supra note 27; A. WIRTH, GECHICHTE FORMOSAS Bi ANFANG 1898
(1898); C. IMBAUET-HUART, L'ILE FORMOSA, HISTOIRE ET DESCRIPTION (1893); IV. GODDARD,
FORMOSA 49-62 (1966); Chuang, The Dutch Rule in Taiwan, TAIWAN WEN SIIIEN, Vol. 10,
No. 3, 1953, at 1-26.
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In 1662, eighteen years after the Ming dynasty was overthrown by
the Manchus, Koxinga (Cheng Cheng-kung) led the remnants of the
Ming from China to refuge on Taiwan, expelling the Dutch and mak-
ing Taiwan his personal kingdom and a base from which to harass the
Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty. In response, the Manchus cleared a ten-
mile wide strip of coastline on the mainland to prevent any contact
with the Ming "traitors."
30
In 1683, an expedition force sent by Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi
and assisted by the Dutch succeeded in asserting nominal authority
over Taiwan. For nearly two centuries, however, the Ch'ing govern-
ment did virtually nothing to govern or develop Taiwan. Local ad-
ministration fell to the mandarins and, probably, to family organi-
zations. To an extraordinary degree, aboriginal tribes in large sectors
of the island retained control and even negotiated certain agreements
with European representatives. 31 A popular Taiwanese saying referred
drily to the prevalence of riot and rebellion and was indicative of
the state of affairs on Taiwan during that period.32
In 1871 the crew of an Okinawan vessel wrecked on the south coast
of Formosa was murdered by the aborigines. When Japan protested
the incident, the Chinese government in Peking disclaimed respon-
sibility on the ground that the outrages had been committed outside
its jurisdiction. Japan then sent a punitive expedition to Formosa.33
The multilateral diplomatic exchanges that preceded and followed this
30. See Chuang. An Account of the Measure of Prohibiting People along South.East
Coast of Mainland to Migrate to Taiwan in early Ching Dynasy [sic, TAIWAN W% .
SHIEN, vol. 15, no. 3, at 1-20, no. 4, at 40-62 (1964).
31. S. YEN, TAivAN IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1836-1874, at 136-39 (1965). Thomas
Wade. the British Minister in Peking, seemed to feel that this situation meant that
China "did not have complete sovereignty over the entire island." Id. at 215.
32. The popular Taiwanese saying was "Every three )-ears a small revolt; every five
years a big one." See OFFICE OF ECONOtMIC REsE..RcIt, BANK OF TAVAN, CIIINc-TAI
TAx-WAN MIN-PIEN-SHIH YEN-CHIl (A Study on the History of Taiuanese Rebellions during
the Ch'ing Dynasty) (1970); Chang, Factors Causing Taiwan People's Resistance Against
Ch'ing Dynasty Marked by Their Successive Uprising and Quick, Subdual [sic], TAIWtAN
WVEN SHINs, vol. 15. No. 4. 1964, at 17-39; Chang, The Internal Disorders and External
Troubles Under the Ch'ing Government in Taiwan, TAIWAN WIEN Sint., vol. 19, No. 2.
1958, at 131-38; Ng, The Identity of Taiwanese vis-a-vis the Ch'ing Dynasty-On the
Eve of Japanese Occupation of Taiwan, TAIWAN, vol. 2, No. 1, 1968. at 19-27.
33. See E. HOUSE, THE JAPANESE EXPEDrrION "TO FoRmmos. (photocopy made in 1963
by Yale University Library Photographic Services of the original edition published in
1875); J. DAVDSON, supra note 27, at chs. 10-13. See also NAOKicni TANAKA & TiEN.snou
TAi, BEIKOKU No TAIWAN SEISAKU (United States Policy Toward Taiwan) 63.84 (1968);
S. YEN, supra note 31; Gordon, Japan's Abortive Colonial Venture in Taiwan, 1874, 37
J. MOD. HIsT. 171 (1965); Koh, The Taiwan Incident, 2 NIHON CAIKOSIII NO 511OMONDAt
(Some Problems in Japanese Diplomatic History) (Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai ed. 1965).
YEN, supra, is a very comprehensive recent study with many useful diplomatic citations,
but the author is rather inconsistent in many of her interpretations and conclusions.
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expedition brought home to the Ch'ing government the necessity of
actually securing control over the territory. No one, it seemed, was
about to recognize a title which the claimant itself could not make
effective.
34
It was not until 1887 that Taiwan was made into a province of
China by the Ch'ing, with Liu Ming-ch'uan as its governor.35 This
occupation lasted only eight years, for China, defeated in the Sino.
Japanese War of 1894-1895, ceded Formosa to Japan by the Treaty
of Shimonoseki of 1895.30 The Treaty itself provided for an interest-
ing test of the development of the political perspectives of the popula.
tion of Taiwan. Taiwanese were allowed a two year period during
which they might opt for Chinese nationality and move to the Chinese
mainland.31 Almost all of the population opted to remain in Taiwan.3 8
It was clear that this did not indicate the absence of any political
identification. On the contrary, the local Taiwanese elite sought to
prevent the cession to Japan. Unable to influence the Manchu gov-
ernment, the Taiwanese revolted and established the Republic of
34. For a survey of European interests and intrigues in Taiwan, see Gordon, Taiwan
and the Powers, 1840-1895, in TAIWAN: STUDIES IN CHINESE LOCAL HISTORY 93 (L. Gordon
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as GoRDoN]; cf. YEN, supra note 31, at 125 et seq.
35. See Chu, Liu Ming.ch'uan and Modernization of Taiwan, 23 J. ASIAN STUDIES 37
(1963). There are a number of datings of this event. The discrepancies, which are not
germane to our study, may be attributed to different translations from the Mancht
calendar year and also to the arrival of the future governor, Liu Ming.ch'uan, before
Taiwan was actually made a "province" by the Manchus.
36. Article II of the Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki between Japan and China reads
as follows:
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories,
together with all fortifications thereon:
(b) The Island of Formosa, together with all the islands appertaining or belong-
ing to said island of Formosa.
(c) The Pescadores Group-that is to say, all islands lying between the l9th and
120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of
north latitude.
See I AM. J. INT'L L. 378 (Supp. 1907).
37. Article V of the Treaty of Shimonoseki read as follows:
The inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their residence
outside the ceded districts, shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire.
For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the rati-
fications of the present act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those
of the inhabitants who shall not have left said territories shall, at the option of
Japan, be deemed Japanese subjects.
Each of the two Governments shall immediately upon the exchange of the nttifica.
tions of the present act send one or more commissioners to Formosa to effect a final
transfer of that province, and within the space of two months after the exchange
of the ratifications of this act such transfer shall be completed.
I AM. J. INT'L L. 378, 380 (Supp. 1907).
38. Only 0.16 per cent of the Taiwanese population opted for Chinese nationality.
NG, supra note 3, at 2-3. See also Ng, Japan's Occupation of Taiwan: Her Internal and
International Measures (1), 69 KoKusAiHo GAIKO ZASSnII (The Journal of International Law
and Diplomacy) 63, 89-90 (1970).
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Taiwan. Within a year, the Republic was suppressed by an invading
Japanese force.3 9 From 1895 to 1945, Formosa was a colony of Japan,40
this formal status continuing until 1951.41
Japanese rule all but obliterated lingering Taiwanese ties with China
and initiated a fifty-year span of fantastic social and economic devel-
opment that left a permanent imprint on the culture and perspec-
tives of the Taiwanese people. By 1939, Taiwan's per capita value of
foreign trade was thirty-nine times greater than China's.
42
At the conclusion of World War II, the Supreme Commander of
the Allied Command in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur,
authorized the Nationalist Chinese authorities to accept the surrender
of Formosa from the Japanese and to undertake temporarily military
occupation of the island as a trustee on behalf of the Allied Powers.43
39. For an excellent study on this first, though short-lived, Republic in Asia. see
YUZIN CHtAurTONG NG, TAIWAN MINSHUKORU No KENYU (A Study on the Republic of
Taiwan) (1970). The author concludes that this was the decisive crystallization of the
Taiwanese political identity and its nationalism. See also H. LA.MLEY. THE TAIWvAi
LITERATI AND EARLY JAPANESE RULE, 1895-1915: A STUDY OF THEIR REAcTIoNs TO Tilc
JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND SUBSEQUENT RESPONSES TO COLONIAL R uLE AND MODEINIZATION.
pt. 2 (1964); Lamley, The 1895 Taiwan Republic: A Significant Episode in Modern
Chinese History, 27 J. ASIAN STUDIES 739 (1968); Lamuley, The 1895 Taiwan War of Re-
sistance: Local Chinese Efforts against a Foreign Power, in GoRDON. supra note 34. at
23-77; Morse, A Short Lived Republic, ThE NEW CHINA REvEw, March 1919, at 23-37;
Woodside, Vang Ching-sung and the Rise of the 1895 Taiwan Republic, 17 PAPEnis O.
CHINA 160 (1963).
40. For the Formosans' resistance against Japanese rule in the early period, see Koh,
The Formosan Resistance during the Course of Establishing Japan's Rule, 1895.1902, 81
KoKzA GAKKAI ZASSHI (The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Sciences)
193-264, 359-407, 503-47 (1968); Ng, supra note 38, at 63-93, 190-213.
As regards Taiwan under Japanese rule, see generally J. B.ALLANT .N, Foros. 22.49
(1952); G. BARCLAY, supra note 23; TADAO YANAIARA. TEIKoKUSIIuGKA N o TAIWAN (Taiwan
under Imperialism) (1929); YOVSBURO TAKEKOSIII, JAPANESE RULE IN Foi.Io-s (G. Braith-
waite transl. 1907); Tzu-wEi Hsu & KUNG-CIIAO IVAN, CliN-JIlt "n T*AIWAN (Taiwan
Today) (1945); J. ONG, supra note 27, at 97-136; M. Sil, supra note 27, at 279.436. For
an interesting comparative study of Japanese colonial policies in Formosa and Korea,
see Chen, Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of
Political Control, 30 HAgy. J. ASIATIC STUDIES 126 (1970).
41. The reference is to the conclusion of the Peace Treat)' with Japan signed at
San Francisco on September 8, 1951. [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I"%.S. No. 2490. It went
into effect on April 28, 1952. See pp. 641-47 inIfra.
42. G. BARCLAY, supra note 23, at 33.
43. Note that Chiang's forces accepted surrender in accord with and on behalf of
the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander. Japan did not surrender to any separate
ally, but to the allies as a group. Thus, Article l(a) of General Order No. I (dated
September 2, 1945) reads:
The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within
China (excluding Manchuria), and Formosa and French Indo.China north of sixteen
degrees north latitude, shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai shek.
Directive by the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to the Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters, 3 WHrr-TAN Di-Esr, supra note 2, at 487, 488 (1964).
Indeed, the orders themselves emphasized the delegatory and representative role of the
individual officers who actually took control of Japanese forces and Japanese territory.
Thus section I(f) stated that "[t]he above indicated Commanders are the only representa.
tives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrender .. ..' Id. For these reasons,
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Chinese occupation proved unfortunate; maladministration, corrup-
tion, atrocities, and deprivations of human rights ensued.44 Formosan
rage exploded on February 28, 1947, in an island-wide popular up-
rising, after the Chinese police killed a Formosan woman for selling
untaxed cigarettes. In suppressing the "2-28 Incident," as the event
is remembered by Formosans, as many as 20,000 Formosan leaders
from all walks of life were seized, tortured and then brutally massacred
in March 1947 by the occupation forces and reinforcements from the
Chinese mainland sent by Chiang Kai-shek. 45 The Formosan leaders
who survived the cephalocide by the Chinese occupation forces went
abroad or underground to continue their struggle for the self-deter-
mination and independence of their state.46
Many contemporary factors contribute to the transformation of a
Professor Schwarzenberger and others went so far as to argue that Japan's surrender
created a condominium over Taiwan in favor of the allies jointly and that this con.
dominium, reinforced by the Peace Treaty with Japan, continues to the present. G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 272, reprinting Letter to the Editor, The Times
(London) Feb. 2, 1955, at 9, col. 5.
44. See J. BALLANTINE, supra note 40, at 57-62; G. KERR, supra note 2, at 61-183; M1.
SmI, supra note 27, at 465-521; ITSu-snu Yo, TAIWAN TO SHO KAI.SEKI: NI-NIIIACIII ?IrN-
HEN 0 CHUSHIN NI (Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek: A Focus on the 2-28 Uprising), pt. 1
(1970). According to the Bank of Taiwan wholesale price indexes, based on June 1937,
the advances from November 1945 to January 1947 were as follows: foodstuffs, 634 per
cent; clothing, 426 per cent; fuel, 1463 per cent; fertilizers, 27,021 per cent; and build ug
materials, 1434 per cent. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA
924 (1949) (Pub. No. 3573). Known as the China White Papers, these documents were,
together with the original Letter of Transmittal to President Truman from Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, a new introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke and an index, reissued
in paperback in two volumes by Stanford University Press in 1967.
45. The precise death tolls may never be known. Estimates range from 5,000 to
20,000; 10,000 has been a widely accepted figure. See J. BALLANTINE, supra note 40, at
63; G. KEaR, supra note 2, at 310.
A solidly documented account of the tragic incident is in G. KERR, supra note 2, pt. S.
Mr. Kerr, as a United States consular officer in Taipei, witnessed the entire incident.
M. Mancall, Book Review, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 23, 1966 (Book Week), at 3.
See also M. SHi, supra note 27, at 524-73; I. Yo, supra note 44; various February issues
of TAIWAN CHENGLIAN (Taiwan Youth), e.g., No. 75 (February 1967); Memorandum on
the Situation in Taiwan, submitted by Ambassador John Leighton Stuart to President
Chiang Kai-shek, April 18, 1947, as reprinted in UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA,
supra note 44, at 923-38.
46. Documentation of the Taiwan independence movement may be found in numerous
press releases and in THE INDEPENDENT FORMOSA (Quarterly), TAIWAN CHIENGLIAN (Taiwan
Youth) (Monthly in Taiwanese and Japanese), and TAI-To (Taiwan Independence) (Month-
ly in Taiwanese)-all published by the World United Formosans for Independence
(WUFI). See Hearings on the United States Relations with the People's Republic of
China, supra note 2, at 347-61, 463-70; World United Formosans for Independence, The
Question of Self-Determination for Formosa-Taiwan, 116 CONG. REC. E9345-46 (1970); Visa
for Professor Ming-min Peng, Leader in Formosan Independence Movement, 116 CONo.
Rlc. S17098 (1970); N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1970, at 6, col. 4; id., Apr. 21, 1970, at 3, cols.
1-4; id., Apr. 25, 1970, at 1, col. 5; id., Aug. 3, 1971, at 2, col. 3; id., Oct. 19, 1971, at 37;
id., Nov. 14, 1971, at 15, col. 1. See also CEN & LASSWELL, supra note 2, at 185-200; G.
KERR, supra note 2, at 451-72; D. MENDEL, supra note 2, at 146-71. For a brief earlier
account, see Ong, A Formosan's View of the Formosan Independence Movement, in M.
MANCALL, supra note 2, at 163-70; Meisner, The Development of Formosan Nationalism,
in id. at 147-62.
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loosely organized ethnic, language or cultural group into a people in
search of political community: the increasing self-identity of peoples
about the globe, the surge of nationalism of groups which are distinct
but for many reasons politically dormant, the burst of anti-colonialism,
the codification in international law of principles and ideologies of
self-determination and, indeed, the rapid proliferation of new states.
Many of these factors must have acted on the traumatic experience
of massacre and political repression. Taiwanese political conscious-
ness, dormant since the suppression of the Republic in 1895, was
indelibly marked by the "2-28" massacre and a renewed, necessarily
secretive, search for national identity accelerated.
Nationalist Chinese deprivation of all Taiwanese civil and political
rights was effected in stages. Initially, the Kuomintang in early 1947
unilaterally declared Formosa to be one of the thirty-five provinces
of the Republic of China, an act in violation of allied accords and,
as will be shown, of no legal effect under international law.47 On
January 21, 1949, at the height of the Chinese civil war between the
Communists and the Nationalists, Chiang Kai-shek legally resigned as
the President of the Republic of China, a post he assumed on May
20, 1948, in Nanking, and was succeeded by then Vice President Li
Tsung-jen. On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communists led by Mao
Tse-tung defeated the Nationalist Chinese (Kuomintang or KMT)
forces headed by Chiang Kai-shek and proclaimed the establishment
of the People's Republic of China. 0
Chiang Kai-shek fled with the remnants of his military and civilian
personnel to Formosa in the autumn of 1949. On March 1, 1950,
Chiang, by a constitutionally irregular, if not illegal act, implanted
himself on Formosa as the "President" of the "Republic of China"
and the actual ruler of Formosa. He installed in power as many gov-
ernment officials and representatives of Kuomintang China as he had
been able to transport, replicating on Taiwan the Nationalist Chinese
constitutional structure designed to govern China. Chiang declared
a permanent state of siege under martial law on Formosa, and, despite
the non-involvement of the local population in the Chinese civil war,
sought to justify his rule by the fiction of fighting the Chinese Com-
munist rebellion.48
47. See pp. 639-41 infra.
48. For a detailed documentation of political repression in Taian see Congressman
Donald M. Fraser's speech, Political Repression in "Free China," 116 Co.sG. REc. E7953.56
(1970). An excellent study on the subject is Peng, Political Offences in Taiwan: Laws
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Chiang's vast bureaucratic pack, which had formerly ruled 500
million Chinese, now ruled eight million Taiwanese. Under the myth
that the Nationalist government still ruled China, the Taiwanese
were only allowed representation proportional to their percentage of
the 500 million people of China, giving them three per cent repre-
sentation in their own homeland. 4 Taiwanese who protested this
and Problems, 47 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 471 (1971). See also CHEN & LASSWELL, supra
note 2, at 132-40, 159-74, 185-200, 250-95; Axelbank, Chiang Kai-shek's Silent Enemies,
HARPER'S, Sept. 1963, at 46-53; Butterfield, When the Crunch Comes, Can Taiwan Hold
Together?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 14-15 el seq.; Ginsburg, Re-
pression in Taiwan, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 17, 1971, at 15-16; Uhalley, The Taiwanese
in Taiwan, in UNDERSTANDING MODERN CHINA 163 (J. Kitagawa ed. 1969); McLeod, Martial
Law in Free China, 83 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1040 (1966); Young, Formosa; Solidarity ol
Gloom, 206 NATION 294 (1968).
49. The Constitution of tire "Republic of China" as currently applied in Taiwan
went into effect in December 1947, while the Nationalist government was still In power
on the mainland. According to the Constitution, the national administration is divided
into three levels: (1) the Central Government, (2) the Provincial Governments, and
(3) the County (City) Governments.
The Central Government consists of the following organs:
(1) The National Assembly: its prime responsibility is to elect (and recall) the Presi-
dent and the Vice President, and to amend the Constitution;
(2) The President: the President is the Head of the State and the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces;
(3) The Five Yuans (a term unique to Chinese political theory, but roughly equivalent
to a "branch" of government):
a. The Executive Yuan: it is "the highest administrative organ";
b. The Legislative Yuan: its prime responsibility is legislation, including appropriation;
c. The Judicial Yuan;
d. The Examination Yuan: it deals with matters pertinent to public functionaries,
ranging from examination and employment to promotion and protection;
e. The Control Yuan: its authority is to censure, to impeach high governmental of-
ficials (including the President and the Vice President), to audit, and to give consent
to certain' key Presidential appointments.
Viewed in terms of their aggregate functions, the National Assembly, the Legislative
Yuan, and the Control Yuan together constitute a "Congress," as commonly understood
in other political systems. The members of these organs are directly or indirectly elected.
The President and the Vice President are chosen by the National Assembly. The highest
officials of the Executive, Judicial and Examination Yuan are appointed by the President
with the consent of either the Legislative or Control Yuan.
In the early part of 1947, while acting in the capacity of belligerent occupier on
behalf of the Allied Powers at a time when, from the legal point of view Formosa
remained Japanese territory, the Nationalist regime unilaterally declared Formosa to be
one of the thirty-five provinces of the Republic of China for the convenience of admin-
istration. Thus when the "Congressional" elections were held by the Nationalist gov-
ernment under the new Constitution in late 1947 and early 1948, Formosa joined it the
process. According to the election laws then in existence, the quota of Taiwan's repre-
sentation was 19 of 3045 members of the National Assembly, 8 of 773 members of tle
Legislative Yuan, and 5 of 223 members of the Control Yuan.
When the Chinese Communists took over the mainland, the Nationalist regime sought
exile in Taiwan in December 1949 and proclaimed Taipei as the new Capital of the
"Republic'of China." Suddenly, the effective domain of the Nationalist regime was
reduced from a land of 3,691,502 square miles and of 500 million people to an "occupied
territory" (Formosa) of 13,885 square miles and of 8 million people (plus the tiny off-
shore islands, Quemoy and Matsu).
There were altogether 2296 "Congressional" representatives-1643 in the National
Assembly, 551 in the Legislative Yuan, and 102 in the Control Yuan-who reported for
duty to the Nationalist regime during the first years of its exile in Formosa (excluding
mainly those who stayed behind on the mainland). These representatives who were
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deprivation of the most minimal of political rights could find them-
selves kidnapped, tortured, tried without due process by a military
tribunal and sentenced to death or to incarceration in a concentra-
tion camp.50 This systematic suppression of civil liberties by the
Kuomintang and the state of martial law which Chiang introduced as
a permanent feature of Taiwanese political life all but paralyzed
domestic opposition to Nationalist Chinese rule by the Taiwanese.
When the Chinese Nationalists fled to Formosa in late 1949, most
observers felt that their regime would disintegrate rather quickly.
The declared policy of the United States at that juncture was to let
events take their course.5 ' On January 5, 1950, President Truman
stated:
In keeping with these declarations [Cairo and Potsdam], For-
mosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for
the past 4 years, the United States and the other Allied powers
have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island. -2
The eruption of the Korean war in June 1950, however, changed
the American attitude. On June 27, 1950, two days after the war
broke out, President Truman declared the "neutralization of For-
mosa" and dispatched the United States Seventh Fleet to the Formosa
Straits area in order to prevent any attack on Formosa and to restrain
any military operations from Formosa against mainland China. He
further stated that "the determination of the future status of Formosa
elected in 1947 or 1948 for a term of three or six years by the constituencies on the
mainland (except the handful of Formosan representatives) found thenselvs without
constituencies as a result of the Nationalist exile to Formosa. Nevertheless, the "Central
Government" in Taipei remains as it was in Nanking in 1949. Hence up to now they
have continued to hold their official pdsitions and to exercise authority in Formoa,
though neither re-elected by, nor responsible to, any constituency whatsoever.
The "Republic of China," as it is styled, has under its effective control only Taiwan.
with a population of fifteen million, of which thirteen million are native Taimanese and
two million are mainland Chinese. The public will of these fifteen million people has
supposedly been reflected during the past twenty-two years by the "Congressional"
representatives elected more than two decades ago by the electorate on the Chinese
mainland. The eighty-seven per cent majority of native Taiwanese are allowed only a
three per cent token representation: thirty-two out of 1448 in the National Assembly.
seventeen out of 447 in the Legislative Yuan, and six out of seventy-four in the Control
Yuan. (These were the figures in 1970 after a token increase of the Taiwanese representa-
tion in 1969). For a more detailed analysis of the political system in Taiman, see Cur, "
LAS sVELL, supra note 2, at 132-37. 250-82.
50. For a most recent example, see the letter written in a Taiwan prison by T.M.
Hsieh to friends in the Taiwanese Independence Movement, From a Taiwan Prison, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1972, at 35, col. 2 (city ed.). See also Fraser Speedh, supra note 48; Peng,
supra note 48; Ginsburg, supra note 48.
51. See generally UNITED STATEs R.LAroN.s wrt CHINA, supra note 44.
52. White House Press Release (Jan. 5, 1950), 22 DEP'r STATE BuLt. 79 (1950).
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must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement
with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."53
In the peace treaty with Japan, signed in San Francisco in Septem-
ber 1951, Japan formally renounced "all right, title, and claim to
Formosa and the Pescadores." The treaty did not, however, specify
to whom Formosa was to be delivered.5 4 The same formulation was
adopted by the peace treaty concluded between the "Republic of
China" and Japan in April 1952.",
Shortly after he took office, President Eisenhower proclaimed that
the United States Seventh Fleet would no longer be "employed to
shield Communist China."5 6 The Nationalist forces made no attempt
to mount a large-scale invasion of the China mainland, but the Peo-
ple's Republic of China in September 1954 initiated artillery shelling
against the offshore islands held by the Nationalists. In the midst of
the crisis, the United States and the Republic of China signed a mu-
tual defense treaty, in December 1954, by which the United States
committed itself to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores and
"such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement."0 7
Mindful of controversies over the legal status of Formosa and the
Pescadores, the United States Senate in ratifying the mutual defense
treaty noted that "nothing in the present treaty shall be construed as
affecting or modifying the legal status or the sovereignty" of Formosa
and the Pescadores.5" In the atmosphere of crisis, the United States
Congress passed the "Formosan Resolution" even before the ratifica-
tion of the mutual defense treaty. The Resolution authorized the
President to employ United States armed forces "as he deems necessary
for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the
Pescadores against armed attack," including "the securing and pro-
tection of such related positions and territories of that area now in
friendly hands." 59
53. 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5 (1950).
54. [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, 25 DEP'T STATE BULL.
349 (1951).
55. 138 U.N.T.S. 3 (1952). Neither the Chinese Nationalist nor the Communist regime
was invited to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference. Hence the Nationalist
regime entered into a bilateral peace treaty with Japan subsequent to the conclusion of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
56. 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 207, 209 (1953).
57. For the text of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the
Republic of China, see [1954] 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213, 31
DEP'T STATE BULL. 899 (1954).
58. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITII THE RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA, S. ExEc. REP. No. 2, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965).
59. H.J. Res. 159, 69 Stat. 7 (Jan. 29, 1955). The text of the Resolution reads as
follows:
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Chinese Communist attacks on the offshore islands were renewed
in August 1958 by artillery barrages against Quemoy and Matsu. In
response, the United States extended its defense commitment to the
offshore islets. 60 Peking has maintained a policy of "ceremonial"
shelling of Quemoy on odd days of the month, symbolizing the con-
tinued existence of the "civil war" between the Chinese Communist
and Nationalist regimes.("
The United States policy of non-recognition and containment of
mainland China was, of course, tempered by a subdued and often
secretive realism.62 Necessary diplomatic contacts were maintained,
"Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations,
is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and
"Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic
of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and
are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and
in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,
"Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security
of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and
"Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island
chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United
States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and
"Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treat), between the United
States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack
in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of
Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties
to the Treaty: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled.
"That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the
Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of
securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority
to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that
area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as lie judges to be
required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.
"This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and
security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action
of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress."
In his memoirs President Eisenhower sheds some light on steps that led to the passage
of this historic resolution. D. EisFNHoWER, THE WITE HOUSE YEARS: IMANITE FOR
CHANcE, 1953-1956 ch. 19 (1963).
On February 23, 1971, Senators Church and Mathias and a number of other Senators
introduced a Resolution to repeal the 1955 Formosa Resolution before the Senate. S.J.
Res. 48, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). After public hearings held on June 24. 25. 28 and
29, and July 20, 1971, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported it favorably to the
Senate without amendment. SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN Rs..*TIo*s, REPEAL Forso-s
RESOLUTION, S. REP. No. 363, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). To date, the plenary Senate has
not acted upon it.
60. D. EISEHowER, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: WAGING PEACE, 1956-1961, ch. 12 (19653).
61. See note 2 supra.
62. For an official exposition of this policy, see Dep't of State Memorandum to Mis-
sions Abroad, United States Policy on Nonrecognition of Communist China, 39 DEs"r
STATE BuLL. 385 (1958). A shifting emphasis on "containment but not isolation" was
evident in the 1966 Senate hearings on China. Hearings on U.S. Policy with respect to
Mainland China Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966). The literature on US. policy toward China is vast. Useful citations include: A.
BA ETr, A NEW POLICY ToWARD CHINA (1971); A. BaNE'rr, CIHINA AFR MAO (1967);
A. BARNETT, COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA (1960); R. BLUM, TiE UNrrED STATES AND CINA
IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1966); CHINA AND OuRsELvas (B. Douglass & R. Terrill eds. 1970); J.
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notably through the United States and Chinese Embassies in Warsaw,
though the content of the communications was guarded by both
sides. a3 After 1969, the frequency and intensity of these diplomatic
exchanges increased markedly. 4 In July 1971, Dr. Henry Kissinger,
the presidential assistant for National Security Affairs, slipped secretly
into China to conduct direct negotiations with Premier Chou En-lai.
Upon Kissinger's return, President Nixon announced a "journey for
peace" to Peking in February of 1972.05 The global political implica-
tions were obvious and other state elites scrambled to realign them-
selves.
In the United Nations, where the Chiang Kai-shek regime had con-
tinued to hold the China seat, a swift and dramatic change ensued.00
On October 25, 1971, the General Assembly voted to "restore all its
rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the repre-
sentatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives
of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representa-
tives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy
at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it."07
Meanwhile, the full extent of the United States policy change was
gradually revealed. In December 1971, Dr. Kissinger stated in a news
conference that "The ultimate disposition, the ultimate relationship
FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA (3d ed. 1971); J. FAIRBANX, CHINA: ThE PEOPLE'S
MIDDLE KINGDOM AND THE U.S.A. (1967); R. MOORSTEEN & M. ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 2;
POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: VIEWS FROM SIX CONTINENTS (A. Halpern ed. 1965); A. STEELE,
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CHINA (1966); THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: TIlE NEXT
DECADE (A. Barnett & E. Reischauer eds. 1970); R. TERRILL, 800,000,000: TIlE REAL
CHINA (1972); Hearings on the United States Relations with the People's Republic of
China, supra note 2; Hearings on United States-China Relations, supra note 2.
63. See generally K. YOUNG, NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: TIlE UNITED
STATES EXPERIENCE, 1953-1967 (1968); Young, American Dealings with Peking, 45 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 77 (1966).
64. See UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's: THE EMERGING STRUCTRE OF
PEACE, A REPORT BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON TO THE CONGRESS 28-41 (1972). See also
A. BARNETT, supra note 2, at 15-24; W. BUELER, U.S. CHINA POLICY, supra note 2, at 63.79.
65. See N.Y. Times, July 16, 1971, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
66. Concerning the question of Chinese participation in the United Nations, see
CHEN & LASSWELL, supra note 2, at 7-81; Panel on Chinese Participation in tle United
Nations, supra note 3, at 1-30. See also R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 131-66 (1963); Tilt INTER-
NATIONAL POSITION OF COMMUNIsr CHINA (L. Tondel ed. 1965); UNA-USA, CHINA, Til
UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES POLICY (1966) (A Report of a National Policy 1'anel);
id. (1967) (A Second Report); McDougal & Goodman, Chinese Participation in the
United Nations: The Legal Imperatives of a Negotiated Solution, 60 Am. J. INT'L L, 671
(1966); Schick, The Question of China in the United Nations, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1232
(1963). For earlier treatments, see S. APPLETON, THE ETERNAL TRIANGLE? COMMUNIST
CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1961) and T. LIE, IN TilE CAUSE
OF PEACE: SEVEN YEARS 'WITH THE UNITED NATIONS (1954).
67. G.A. Res. 2758, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 26, 1971, at 1, col. 8; U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Nov. 1971, at 34-61; 26
U.N. GAOR (provisional), U.N. Does. A/PV. 1966-76 (1971).
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of Taiwan to the People's Republic of China should be settled by
direct negotiations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of
China."68 On February 9, 1972, President Nixon, in his oratorical in-
novation, "The State of the World" message, stated:
The ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is
not a matter for the United States to decide. A peaceful resolution
of this problem by the parties would do much to reduce tension
in the Far East. We are not, however, urging either party to follow
any particular course. 9
At the conclusion of Mr. Nixon's eight-day tour of China, the joint
Chinese-United States communique issued in Shanghai on February
27, 1972 stated, in addition to the usual Chinese assertion of sov-
ereignty over Taiwan, that:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does
not challenge that position.70
Although the Administration expended considerable subsequent ef-
forts to dispel the impression gained in Congress that there had been
a change of policy regarding the status and disposition of Taiwan,7 1
the change was deemed patent in chanceries about the world.72
The political volte face has had an extraordinary impact within
Taiwan itself. Academics, students, clergymen and business leaders
suddenly began to voice political opinions which would have been
condemned as seditious and treasonous scant months before. Always
skirting the delicate and dangerous question of the legitimacy of the
Chiang family on Taiwan, this new political chorus has reiterated
two points: First, the people of Taiwan, including the small minority
of exiled mainlanders who have sought refuge on the island-state,
68. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1971, at 19, col. 1.
69. UNrrt STATES FOPxiGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's, supra note 64, at 39; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 10, 1972, at 20, col. 5 (city ed.).
70. Id., Feb. 28, 1972, at 16, col. 5 (city ed.).
71. Id., Mar. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
72. See, e.g., id., Feb. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 6, and at 16, cols. 2.3 (city ed.). In addition,
Britain and China agreed on March 13, 1972 to establish full diplomatic relations after
the British government had acknowledged that Taiwan was "a province" of China,
reversing its long-standing position that Taiwan's international legal status remained
undetermined. Id., Mar. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.). See also id., Feb. 29, 1972, at
17, col. 3 (remarks of Premier Sato of Japan regarding Taiwmn's status immediately fol-
lowing the issuance of the Shanghai communique).
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want to control their own destiny and do not want to be delivered
to the People's Republic of China. Second, participation in all
branches of the government must in fact become representative and
realistically reflect the true aspirations of the present population of
Taiwan rather than the fictional aspirations of the population of China
in 1947.
73
There seems to be a certain international reluctance to address these
demands squarely. Inexplicably, the fifteen million people of Taiwan
seem to have dropped below a threshold of international political
visibility. While the United Nations has resolved the question of
which government represents China in the United Nations, it has
not resolved the controversy about the status of Taiwan.7 4 Though
the Chinese Nationalist. regime continues to control Taiwan, the ques-
tion of who owns Taiwan and who represents the people of Taiwan
remains to be solved.
In the sections that follow, the international law of territorial con-
trol, as it evolved at different periods, will be correlated with the
political history of Taiwan, in order to determine which states, if
any, had perfected sovereignty over the island-state and the subse.
quent tenability and validity of such claims under the intertemporal
principles unique to this form of international community control.
III. The Status of Taiwan Before 1887
International law drew on Roman law for its theory of territorial
control, designating occupation, prescription, cession, annexation, and
accretion as modes of acquisition.75 Because international decision has
encountered many situations for which there were no patent ana-
73. E.g., the statement issued on December 29, 1971 by the Taiwan Presbyterian
Church. The Christian Tribune (in Chinese, Taipei), Jan. 2, 1972, at 1. See also N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1972, at 14, col. 6; id., Feb. 20, 1972, at 32, col. 1; id., Mar. 12, 1972, at
3, col. 5 (city ed.).
74. The General Assembly did not express an opinion on the question of title to Taiwan,
The Albanian Resolution, G.A. Res. 2758, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 2, U.N. Doe. A/8429
(1971) called for the expulsion of "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place
which they unlawfully occupy." Nor can the Assembly's rejection at the same session of
a United States' motion for a separate vote on the question of expulsion of Chlang's
representatives be construed as a vote about Taiwan, for the U.S. motion was completely
ultra vires, the Charter. The General Assembly may decide representation questions, as
it did in this case, but it may not admit a new member without a prior recommendation
by the Security Council. Such a recommendation is a necessary preliminary to Assembly
action, as held by the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Na-
tions, [1950] I.C.J. 4. Since the U.S. motion was, perforce, for admission, it was quite
out of order and was properly rejected by the Assembly.
75. H. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUcTiON TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 139 et seq.
(2d ed. 1952); R. LEE, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 105 et seq. (1944); A. WATSON, Trim
LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 16 et seq. (1968).
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logues in the law of the Roman municipium,7 new doctrines have
been adduced or innovated over time. Although some of these have
been rejected by international decision, a number have been incor-
porated either as claim categories or relevant considerations in title
determinations. Where even faintly relevant, they must be examined
in any international title search. Therefore we shall test the historical
record for congruence to every possible claim, even those the claimants
themselves may not have lodged.
A. Prescriptive Title
Numerous political and legal statements uttered by both Com-
munist and Nationalist Chinese representatives state as self-evident
fact that Taiwan has always been part of China.7 7 It is not clear from
these statements what the reference, through time, to China really is,
but assuming that proponents of this view mean that Taiwan has
always been under the direct political control of a centralized gov-
ernment on the mainland or, less rigorously, that for a long time it
was widely accepted that mainland governments owned and ruled
Taiwan, we are presented with a claim of title by prescription.,8
International prescription confirms stable control as tide. In Gris-
badarna, for example, the tribunal held:
[I]t is a settled principle of the law of nations that a state of things
which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be
changed as little as possible.7 9
No specific period of time is required and indeed certain arbitral
tribunals have set quite short time intervals for the establishment
of prescriptive title.8 0 The requisite components of prescriptive title
76. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTE NATIONAL LAW
99 ff. (1927); I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 545 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1935)
[hereinafter cited as OPPEN Ei]. Professor O'Connell develops a different explanation
for the inapplicability of Roman termini technici to the contemporary international
law of acquisition. According to him the fact of physical control, coupled with a claim
which was often sufficient to secure title at Roman Law, has in international law
"never been recognized in practice to suffice for sovereignty." I D. O'CoN.ELL, I.NTEr-
NATIONAL LAW 406 (2d ed. 1970).
77. See note 3 supra.
78. On international prescription in general, see 2 GRorIus, DE JuRE BELL AC PActs
ch. 4; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 76, at 575; 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 330 el seq. (2d
ed. 1945); 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 76, at 422; 1 G. SCHWARZENUERGER, I.NERNATIONAL
.Aw 139 (1949).
79. Grisbadarna (Norway v. Sweden) 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 155 (1908); J. ScoTT, HAGUE
COURT REPORTS 121 (publ. 1916). A more refined policy statement was offered in Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 591, 639 (1846): "For the security of right,
whether of states or individuals, long possession under a claim of title is protected." See
also note 6 supra.
80. Thus, in the British Guiana-Venezuela Boundary Dispute (U.S. v. Great Britain).
the compromis stipulated as the criterion for title a period of fifty years of adverse
The Yale Law Journal
include effective and manifest control in which others acquiesce.
Acquiescence will not be inferred unless control can be shown to
have been notorious enough to provide a signal and reasonable op.
portunity for protest, a point emphasized by Judge Huber in the
Island of Palmas case. 8' In assessing the appropriate degree of control
required in each case, international tribunals have taken the milieu
into account. An uninhabited atoll, for example, would require mini-
mum control, the requirement perhaps being met by an annual visit
of naval officials.8s2 On the other hand, an inhabited territory would
require continuous and open public administration in order to
establish a prescriptive title.83 Without regard to the density of in-
habitants, the requisite level of administration might be considerably
lower if the territory in question were part of a larger domain already
under control or were hinterland or otherwise contiguous with con-
trolled territory and not readily accessible to outsiders.8 4
possession; 89 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 57 (1896). In Sarropoulos v. Bulgarian
State, Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (1927-1928), Ann. Dig. 263 (No. 173),
a period of twenty years was specified in the compromis. For a survey of doctrinal
opinion, see Y. BLUM, HiSrORIc TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-54 (196i).
Lauterpacht writes that "[N]o general rule can be laid down as regards the length
of time and other circumstances which are necessary to create a title by prescription."
1 O'PENHEIM, supra note 76, at 576.
81. 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (1928). See also Delagoa Bay, 5 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
ARBImTATIONS 4984, 4985 (1898). In Clipperton Island, lack of notification of French
occupation was invoked as a defect in title, but the arbitrator concluded that publi.
cation in English in a journal in Hawaii of the French claim was sufficient. ThIough
the language of the award suggests that this publication in itself constituted sufficient
notoriety, many other factors clearly influenced the outcome, not the least of which
was the lapse of seventy-three years from the original claim to the moment of arbitral
award. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 391, 394 (1932). For other contextual features of which
judicial notice has been taken in regard to the requirement of notification for purposes
of allowing an opportunity to protest, see Delagoa Bay, supra, and Anglo.Norweglan
Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 138.
82. Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 840 (1928). See also Clipperton Island, 26
Am. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932). Note, however, that under the strict application of the state.
ment of law rendered there, France probably did not secure title. The arbitrator stated
that in the case of an uninhabited territory, actual occupation might not be necessary
"if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely uninhabited, is from the
first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the absolute and
undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession must
be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed." Id. at 394.
Clipperton was certainly not at the absolute and undisputed disposition of France after
1858, as the precipitating events of the case showed.
83. Even that might not be sufficient in special circumstances, as was held by the
International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Lands, [1959] I.C.J. 209, 229. But cf. the declaration of Judge Lauterpacht, id. at 231-32.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Armand-Ugon concluded that venerable treaties not.
withstanding, the fact that the Netherlands exercised preponderant governmental fulinc-
tions in the contested plots and that Belgium acquiesced "created an indisputable right
of sovereignty in favour of the Netherlands Government." Id. at 250.
84. Legal Status of the South Eastern Territory of Greenland Case, ([1932) P.C.I.J.,
ser. A/B, No. 48, at 264. But cf. Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain l'rontier Lands,
[1959] I.C.J. 209. In a note on Clipperton Island, Edwin Dickinson abstracted as "re-
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Prescription as a sole ground for territorial acquisition is probably
inadequate under contemporary international law, for it fails to take
account of certain peremptory norms which have arisen in this century
and which affect all territorial regimes.8 5 Nonetheless, prescription
was a valid mode of territorial acquisition through the nineteenth
century, since it was an expression of contemporaneous policies of
control, stability of expectation and maximum resource use. Hence
a Chinese assertion of prescriptive title perfected in this period would
under intertemporal principles vindicate part of their general claim to
Taiwan. 6
The available historical record does not, however, support a Chi-
nese claim for prescriptive title. By unequivocal behavior, China rec-
ognized Dutch control over Formosa in the seventeenth century and
made no claim of sovereignty.87 The Dutch were driven out by Koxinga
in 1662, whose independent regime in Formosa survived until 1683.
For the next two centuries, there were periodic uprisings and public
order was in effect the prerogative of local clans and extended fam-
ilies. Shortly after the 1871 incident involving the Okinawan vessel,
the Ch'ing government stated to Japan that large sections of Formosa
were outside its jurisdiction, averring it could not be held responsible
for injuries inflicted by Formosans.88 Claims for prescriptive title are
alistic and altogether satisfactory" the principle that "the occupation which is required
is such an occupation as is appropriate and possible under the circumstances. It is a
question of' fact." Dickinson, The Clipperton Island Case, 27 A.m. J. INV'L L 130, 133
(1933). In a different context, Hersch Lauterpacht wrote that "elfectiveness is not a
magic formula which can be applied with mathematical precsion. It is effectiveness
relative to the situation and the circumstances." Lauterpacht, Sovereignty ov, er Sub-
marine Areas, 27 BRrT. Y.B. Irr'sL L. 376, 429 (1950).
85. See pp. 654-60 infra.
86. International prescription is less rigorous than the older doctrine of historic title
or special custom. See Y. BLUM!, supra note 80, at 99 et seq. In the light of available
Taiwanese history, such an older doctrine would not sustain a Chinese title. See pp. G03.
12 supra. International prescription can also be distinguished from Roman usucapio
and possessio longi temporis, which always involved possession for a determinate number
of years. See H. JoLowicz, supra note 75, at 152. A third method akin to prescriptive
acquisition at Roman law-vetustas-did not specify time; however, it conve)ed no more
than a rebuttable presumption of title erga omnnes rather than title itself.
Whether such principles can be applied in international law is mooted in the present
case, for China did not, as a matter of fact, exercise adequate control for a sufficiently
extended time period.
87. See note 29 supra.
88. Chinese legal formulations in this period are quite revealing in that the) simul.
taneously claimed Taiwan and yet conceded absence of control. For a sensitive perception
of the Chinese dilemma, see GORDON, TAIWAN A D THlE Pow.ao, supra note 34. at 93.
One attempt to escape from this dilemma was to insist that different principles applied
to the Mandate of Heaven. Another was to distort Western legal notions so that the),
seemed to support the Ch'ing position. See S. YErN, supra note 31, at 220-21. Still a third
rationalization was to claim that the lack of control in Taiwan was a matter of policy.
Thus the Ch'ing Foreign Office (Tsungli 'arnen) communicated to Japan in 1874 that
Taiwan is an island lying far off in the sea and we did not )et restrain the abo-
rigines inhabiting it by any legislation nor establish any government over them,
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also marred by the vigorous protest of the inhabitants of Formosa
themselves throughout these two centuries.8 0
Given the density of inhabitants, the low level of administration,
the Chinese government's own unwillingness to assume international
responsibility, Formosan protests, and China's own admission against
interest, the more cautious position would require rejection of a
Chinese claim for prescriptive title over Taiwan, even under the
more lenient intertemporal standards of earlier centuries.
B. Occupative Title
Occupation as a means of acquiring title in international law took
form in the period of European expansion. It required two com-
ponents: an intention to secure sovereignty and the exercise of con-
tinuously effective control, the former being derivable from the lat-
ter.90 The leading arbitral and judicial controversies turn on the ques-
tion of control, for declarations of ownership are easily made by all
parties.91 Control is the critical factor because international law's
concern with title involves establishing responsibility for areas and,
following in this a maxim mentioned in Li-chi (The Book of Rites): Don't change
the usage of a people but keep their proper ones. But the territories inhabited by
the aborigines are truly within the jurisdiction of China.
Id. at 217. One might note that proper usages in question here involved beheading
foreign seamen. The Japanese position had been stated in an earlier communication:
"The land of the aborigines is not under the administration and culture of China. They
live by themselves." Id. at 327.
89. See note 32 and p. 609 supra. While there are venerable natural law doctrines
insisting on the volition of the population as a component of sovereignty, we are not,
in this context, stating or implying that such a norm was operative at some critical
moment in the past and that Chinese claims to title over Taiwan founder on it. In
subsequent discussion (p. 660 et seq. infra), we note that the natural law doctrine
related, in previous centuries, primarily to consent to form of government rather than
title. The shift of emphasis to popular volition as a component of title began to acquire
force in the 19th century. See F. DEMARTENS, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 469 (LUo
trans. 1883) and authorities cited. Since the focus here is on the protest of the Taiwanese
themselves, we assimilate the islanders to any other group of protestors.
90. On occupation, see generally 1 0t'1'ENnEIM, supra note 76, at 554-63; 1 D. O'CON-
NELL, supra note 76, at 408 et seq.; R. JENNINGs, THE AcQUIsITIoN or TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-23 (1963). The formulation we have used in the text gives more
overt emphasis to the animus component than is found in earlier formulations. While
animus to possess was implicit in these earlier formulations, successive patterns of
control, such as protectorates, mandates, trusts, etc., require a more explicit reference
to the psychological component; in cases such as these, "possession and administration,"
to use Lauterpacht's formulation (1 0P'ENHEIm, supra note 76, at 557-58), did not secure
a title occupatione.
91. See, e.g., Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928); Clipperton Island, 26 A.
J. INT'L L. 390 (1932); Delagoa Bay (Portugal v. Great Britain), 5 J. MOORE, supra note
81, at 4984 (1898); 3 G. DE MARTENS, NOUVEAU RECUEIL GENERAL DE TRAITEs 517 (2d
ser. 1878); British Guiana Boundary Arbitration, H. LA FONTAINE, PASICRISIE INTERNA-
TIONALE 556 (1902).
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at least in the nineteenth century, ready access to resources.12 The
cases indicate that there is no fixed quantum of control, but rather
that in each case a measure of control appropriate to the circumstances
will be determined by authoritative decision. Although claims of title
on account of discovery were made in the past, modern writers sug-
gest that this was never firm law.
93
From the sixteenth century onward, the Chinese population of Tai-
wan increased at the expense of the aboriginal indigenes, until tie
latter assimilated almost entirely into the newer wave; this and other
92. The extent to which territorial sovereignty came to be viewed as an inclusihe
technique for assuring the access of all peoples to resources in the exclusive sphere
cannot be overemphasized. Some intimations of this idea may be found in Judge Huber's
award in Island of Palmas, supra note 82. The idea was central in intellectual discussions
of the lawfulness and morality of forcing Western entry into Japan. Consider the fol-
lowing example: "The compulsory seclusion of the Japanese is wrong not only to them-
selves, but to the civilized world. . . .The Japanese undoubtedly have an exclusive
right to the possession of their territory; but tile), must not abuse that right to the
extent of debarring all other nations from a participation in its riches and virtues. The
only secure title to property, whether it be a hovel or an empire, is, that the exctsive
possession of one is for the benefit of all." 96 EDINBURGn REVIEW 196, quoted in W.
BEAsLEY, THE MODER.N HisTORY OF JAPAN 43 (1963).
93. Grotius argued that discovery secured no title unless followed by possession: See
GROTIUS, FR.DOnmt OF THE SEAS ch. 2 (R. Magoffin trans. 1916). According to Pufendorf.
"The bare seeing a thing or the knowing where it is, is not judged a sufficient Title
of Possession." S. PUFENDORF, DE JuRE NATuiuvE rr GEFTIuMs LinRI OCrO IV, VI, VIII
(1688). A contrary view in 1 T. Twss, THE LAw oF NATIONS CONSIDEM.ED As LDEPENOENT
POLITICAL COMMUNITIEs 162 (2d ed. 1884) is that there was a doctrine of discovery. Twiss
purported to base his argument on language in Wolff. Lindley, however. notes that a
careful reading of Wolff reveals a peremptory demand for possession in addition to tie
claim of discovery. M. LINDLEY, THE AcoUIsITioN AND GOVERN.%sE.%T OF BAC~WArD Tn-
RITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LA 131-32 (1928). Vattel seems to have believed that discovery
gave an "inchoate title" which would be respected if it were followed by occupation.
E. DE VArrEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS, bk. I, § 207 (1760). This is a perplexing doctrine
which would be meaningful only if a usage or custom attended it, according to which
a certain interval of time was assured the discoverer by all other states to allow it to
crystallize its inchoate title through occupation. For cases and doctrine purporting to
support such a view, see I OPPENHEIM, supra note 76, at 559. See particularly, Island
of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 869 (1928).
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
573 (1823), stated that "[d]iscovery gave title to the government by whose subjects or
by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title
might be consummated by possession." See also id. at 576. Both Marshall and Story in I
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrrTTIo OF TIE UNITED STATES § 2 (4th ed. 1873)
suggested that the policy behind this was an inter-European accord to avoid friction
over conflicting claims. Such friction does not appear to have been avoided. Hence it
is submitted that the minority view presented by Marshall and Story is incorrect. Tile
contrary policy argument, forwarded by Judge Huber in Island of Palmas, emphasized
the purpose of the territorial regime of international law as order and effectiveness. For
this reason, discovery alone, he stated, could not confer sovereignty.
By the nineteenth century, the doctrine that title might be obtained by discovery alone
had been completely abandoned. See, e.g., Delagoa Bay (Portugal v. Great Britain), supra
note 81 and 1 OEr.NH.EIt, supra note 76, at 558: "Although even in the age of discoveries
States did not maintain that the fact of discovering a hitherto unknown territory was
equivalent to acquisition through occupation by the State in whose service the dis-
coverer made his explorations, the taking of possession was frequently in the nature
of a mere symbolic act. Later on, a real taking possession was considered neccssary."
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factors created a new Taiwanese ethnic identity.04 In the light of
this increase, one would expect the quantum of effective control
required for purposes of occupative title to be considerably higher
than the liberal standards adopted in the authoritative Island of
Palmas,95 Clipperton Island,96 and Eastern Greenland cases."7 In each
of these instances, the lands in question were comparatively unin-
habited, if inhabitable at all. In Palmas, for example, the litigants
contended over a small island in the Pacific, thousands of miles from
each of their administrative centers. Judge Huber observed that
"[a]part from the consideration that the manifestations of sovereignty
over a small and distant island, inhabited only by natives, cannot
be expected to be frequent, it is not necessary that the display of
sovereignty should go back to a very far distant period."0 8 Taiwan
is not sufficiently removed from China to justify adopting the Palmas
standard. On the other hand, whatever the standard adopted, it
should approximate and not exceed the level of public administra-
tion common and contemporaneous in the metropolitan area. Thus
effective control in Taiwan should have been as high but not higher
94. If the Chinese who migrated from Fukien province to Taiwan had gone as settlers
over whom the Chinese Empire continued to claim personal authority, one might argue
for the development of coordinate Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. See, e.g., M. LINDLEY,
supra note 93, at 85; 1 OPI'ENHEIM, supra note 76, at 544. But "if, although all or a large
majority of the settlers were subjects of the same State, that State definitely refuses to
accept, or after a reasonable time has not assumed, international responsibility for the
settlement, then, when the settlers have developed an efficient government of their own,
a new State will have been born." M. LINDLEY, supra at 90. The record indicates that
not only did the Empire not take responsibility or seek control over migrants, but it
prohibited migration and punished it severely. Thus, the Ch'ing dynasty imposed capital
punishment on those who "clandestinely proceed to sea to trade, or who remove to
foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating same." V. PURCELL, Til
CHINESE IN SOUTHEASr ASIA 26 (2d ed. 1965). See also note 30 supra. Nor was any diplo.
matic protection extended. Responding to a massacre of Chinese in the Dutch East Indies,
Emperor Chien Lung said: "In order to go abroad to make a profit, these heavenly.court.
abandoned people even deserted their ancestors' tombs. The Court does not care what
happened to them." Jan, Nationality and Treatment of Overseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia, 1960, at 46 (unpublished New York University doctoral dissertation, University
Micro-films, Inc.), quoted in D. Clark, Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia: Nationality
Laws and Economic Nationalism, 1971 (unpublished student paper in Yale Law Library).
During the negotiation of the Sino-American Treaty of Tien-Tsin of 1858, see 2 MAJOR
PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HisroRY 1648-1967, at 763-76 (F. Israel ed. 1967), Tlng.Hsiang
Tan said, "When the emperor rules over so many millions, what does he care for the few
waifs that drifted away to a foreign land?" Jan, supra, at 48. Nor was there any economic
interest in the emigrants: "The Emperor's wealth is beyond computation; why should
he care for those of his subjects who have left their home or for sands they have scraped
together?:' Id. It was not until December 1859 that the government of Kwangtung
Province began to issue permits to Chinese laborers to go abroad. Nonetheless, the Ch'lng
dynasty's anti-emigration law was not repealed until 1894. Id. at 13. Thus, there can
be no Chinese claim of sovereignty over Taiwan by virtue of the fact that Chinese"nationals" settled there in the past.
95. Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
96. Clipperton Island, 26 Ass. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932). See also notes 82-84 supra.
97. Greenland case, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 48, at 264.
98. Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.LA.A. 829, 840, 868-70 (1928).
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than that exercised in, for example, Fukien province, allowing for
lapses in administration in Taiwan because of disruptions which might
have occurred in a comparable metropolitan area.
By this more lenient standard, a case for Chinese title occupatione
over Taiwan might be made. During much of this period, the main-
land was troubled by disruptions which would account for and ex-
onerate the sporadic and inefficient control exercised over Taiwan.
There is, nevertheless, a problem of intention, for the evidence strongly
suggests that China did not intend to acquire sovereignty over Taiwan.
We have noted the Ch'ing practice of prohibiting emigration and,
in effect, of denationalizing emigres. In the early 1870's, it will be
recalled, the Ch'ing government stated to Japan that large sections
of Formosa were outside its jurisdiction and that China could not
be held internationally responsible for damages inflicted by For-
mosans.99
Thus, as in the case of prescriptive title, China's claim to title to
Taiwan on the basis of occupation remains at best quite clouded.
C. Contiguous Title
From time to time, claims of title jure gentium have been made
on the basis of contiguity. Taiwan lies about 110 miles off the main-
land, making China, in purely geographic terms, the closest major
state.10 0 Taiwan shares the continental shelf of mainland China, a
geographical fact recently invested with title implications. 10' The
island system of which Taiwan is a part, however, is held for the most
part by Japan, and there are Japanese islands quite close by. Thus,
from a purely factual standpoint, one cannot establish with certainty
that China is most intimately contiguous with Taiwan.
As a matter of law, the question of a legal title by reason of con-
tiguity is controversial. In Island of Pamas,02 Judge Huber said:
99. See pp. 609-10 supra.
100. Although geographical proximity may be an important variable for certain mat-
ters, it is only one variable. Cf. N. HILL, CLAIMS To TERuuroaY IN IraN.Eo-AIONAL LAW
AND RELATIONS 53-80 (1945). The more critical factor may be the degree of integration
in all value processes. In this respect, Taiwan may be geographically proximate to China.
but worlds away from it in social and economic terms. See generally Wright, Territorial
Propinquity, 12 A.st. J. INT'L L. 519 (1918) and pp. 606-08 supra.
101. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Deumark:
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands). [1969] I.CJ. 4-54. But cf. Article 6, Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, 1958, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 131L.55. See also note 21
supra.
102. Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
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Although States have in certain circumstances maintained that
islands relatively close to their shores belonged to them in virtue
of their geographical situation, it is impossible to show the ex-
istence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that
islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a
State from the mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma.105
In an earlier period, Grotius argued for the delimitation of defensible
boundaries' 04 and subsequent commentators have suggested that this
might be applied to islands. 0 5 The most that can be inferred from
those cases in which the notion of contiguity was invoked, however,
is that an inchoate right may exist but must be perfected through
the usual modalities.100 Under contemporary conditions, the ratio
legis of contiguity is all but obsolescent, changes in weapons tech-
nology now having minimized the importance of space and time in
territorial security.
D. Claims of Colonial Protectorate
A unique quasi-proprietary form recognized in international law
until the last century, and perhaps still enjoying some authoritative
103. Id. at 854. Judge Huber introduced much confusion by failing to note that prior
cases of title by contiguity dealt with islands quite close to the respective mainland.
Bulama Island, for example, was, in President Grant's words, "so near it [the African
mainland] that animals cross at low water." Bulama Island Case (Great Britain v.
Portugal, 1870), 61 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1103, 1104. In that case many other
factors were considered before Portuguese title was recognized. The famous dictum In
The Anna, 5 Ch. Robinson's Reports 371, 165 Eng. Rep. 809, 815 (1805) referred to
silt islands at the mouth of the Mississippi. Other cases of contiguity refer to the
hinterland rather than islands beyond the territorial sea. Furthermore, the context is
usually one of comparatively uninhabited areas, rather than densely poputlated and
politically organized islands situated at great distances from the coast. Thus, the Lobos
Islands claimed by Peru were uninhabited and were twenty to thirty miles from thecoast. 1 J. MOORE, A DicEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265-66, 575 (1906). But the Falkland
Islands, claimed by Argentina, were 250 miles from the coast and were uninhabited. 20
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 314 (1831); J. MOORE, supra.
104. 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 78, at ch. 3, § 16.
105. 1 T. Twss, supra note 93, § 131. Lauterpacht may have had some syumpathy
with this position: H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 84, at 425-27. Professor O'Connell cites
Judge Huber in Island of Palmas but closes his discussion somewhat ambiguously by
stating that "the persuasiveness of the notion of propinquity is demonstrated by the
evolution of the continental shelf conception." 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 76, at 421.
See Wright, supra note 100, at 519-21; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 76, at 560. Professor
Waldock rejects the doctrine of contiguity. Waldock, The Legal Basis of Claims to lte
Continental Shelf, 36 TRANSACTIONS OF GROTrUS SOCIETY 115, 120 (1950). Professor Jennings
follows Waldock. "Contiguity is an aspect of possession. It cannot be a root of title
independent of possession." R. JENNINGS, supra note 90, at 74. Professor Blum seems to
reject the doctrine: Y. BLUM, supra note 80, at 176-77. See also The Anna, 165 Eng, Rep.
809 (1805). But cf. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. United Kingdom), (1953]
I.C.J. 47. On the thorny question of contiguity and self-defense, see p. 653 infra.
106. Thus, Professor Wright, summarizing practice, concluded that contiguity of an
uninhabited island gave rise to a claim of constructive possession, which in itself did
not establish a right of sovereignty; title was perfected, in the words of Mr. Webster in
the Lobos Island controversy, by "unequivocal acts of absolute sovereignty anti owner-
ship." I J. MOORE, supra note 103, at 575, cited in Wright, supra note 100, at 521, n.10.
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status in contemporary law under other names, 107 was the colonial
protectorate. According to this institution, a more powerful state
could acquire exclusive authority over many of the internationally
relevant activities of smaller states or territorial entities without in-
corporating those states or precipitating a debellatio of their partial
or plenary international legal personality.10s Although the term "co-
lonial protectorate" has been used for the most part in regard to the
relations of European colonizers or international charter companies
purportedly acting under their authority,1 09 functional equivalents
may be found in the international relations of the non-Western
world inter se. A case in point is the expansion of Imperial China
which, on a number of occasions, established hegemonial control over
peripheral territories without actually incorporating them. Striking
examples of this practice occurred in Burma, Vietnam, Nepal, Korea,
and, probably, Formosa. 10 Significantly, Mao Tse-tung is reported to
have said in 1936:
It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories,
not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This
means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however,
include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-
established the independence of the lost territories of China and
if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese
imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help. The same
thing applies for Formosa. As for Inner Mongolia, which is popu-
lated by both Chinese and Mongolians, we will struggle to drive
Japan from there and help Inner Mongolia to establish an au-
tonomous state."'
Thus the external practices of the Chinese empire allowed for a range
of relationships of less than diadic equality with other states. Many
of these seemingly unique practices were parallel to the colonial re-
finements of imperial Europe. As regards Taiwan, the available evi-
dence, reinforced by subsequent authoritative commentaries, points
strongly to a status for that island-state which confirmed its inde-
107. The contemporary notion of "sphere of influence." for example, seems to receive
some recognition in exceptions which may have been made for the US. and tile USS.R.
in the Western hemisphere and in Eastern Europe, respectively. One might compare,
for example, such seemingly disparate doctrines as The Brezhnev Doctrine, N.Y. Times.
Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 1, and The Selden Resolution, H.R. Res. 560, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 111 CONG. Rac. 24347 (1965). Sphere of influence, so understood, is to be distin-
guished from the more traditional notion. But cf. M. LINDLXY, supra note 93, at 205 et seq.
108. For a comprehensive discussion, see I C. HYDE, supra note 78, at 44-90. See also,
M. LINDLEY, supra note 93, at 181 et seq.; I OPr rcmm., supra note 76, at 194.96.
109. M. LINDLEY, supra note 93, at 91-113.
110. See note 28 supra.
111. E. SNow, RED STAR OVER CHINA 88-89 (rev. ed. 1938) (emphasis added).
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pendence but subjected it to a type of heteronomic control, recog-
nized in international law.
In terms of the law contemporaneously in force at the different
times from the termination of Dutch suzerainty until 1887,112 it seems
doubtful that China ever perfected a title over Taiwan. Arguably,
China developed an inchoate title which might have been perfected
in a subsequent period if certain other acts had transpired within
a sufficient time interval.1 13 But the record does not warrant the
conclusion that there was such perfection under any of the grounds
of acquisition recognized by the pertinent international laws then
prevailing.114 At most, a relationship may have come into force be-
tween China and Formosa which was functionally equivalent to a
colonial protectorate.
IV. Taiwan Annexed and Ceded: 1887-1895
Commercial and strategic circles close to the Ch'ing throne, in-
creasingly aware of the potential value of Formosa, pressed for a real
annexation of the island and in 1887 Formosa was proclaimed a
province of China.1 5 The annexation, as noted earlier, was short-lived.
War broke out between China and Japan in 1894 and, within a year,
China was defeated. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, China
agreed to the euphemistic "independence" of Korea and to the out-
right cession of Formosa to Japan."' It is possible to argue that the
period of annexation-only eight years-was insufficient for consolidat-
112. P. 610 supra.
113. The Delagoa Bay case between Portugal and Great Britain is a useful and still
relevant precedent for the components additional to discovery which are necessary to
change an "inchoate title" into a secure title erga omnes. In that case, there were addi-
tional findings of occupation, the forceful exclusion of other contenders from occupation
and the exercise of authority there, exclusive trading, the absence of protest by other
states in the area, the attitude of the indigenes, and express and tacit admissions of
Portuguese title by the English themselves. 5 J. MooR, supra note 81.
The point of emphasis is that international law employs a variety of quite refined
indices to determine whether there has been sufficient and appropriate activity to render
an inchoate title into firm title.
114. An alternate characterization of the history of Taiwan might argue that the
inchoate title, if it vested at all in the Chinese Empire, was abandoned and hence
Taiwan was in fact territorium derelictum; both Pufendorf and Vattel confirmed this
institution in international law, and the doctrinalists discuss a number of cases some of
which bear striking similarity to Taiwan in the period before the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
See generally M. LINDLEY, supra note 93, at 48ff.
115. See note 35 supra.
116. Articles I and 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. For the text in Chinese, see
Lieh Ch'iang Chin-Lueh (The Aggression of Foreign Powers), in CuuNG-IIUA MIN-XUO
K'AI-KUO WU-SHIH NIEN WVEN-HSIEN (Documents on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Re-
public of China), pt. 1, bk. 5, at 408-12 (1964). For the English text see 1 AMI. J. INT'L L.
378 (Supp. 1907). For an extensive account of the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki
and the relevant documents, see Lieh Ch'iang Ch'in-Lueh, supra at 335-442.
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ing title under international law, since it did not provide sufficient
time for adequate notice and protest, actions which might have im-
paired China's othenvise perfected title over the island by annexa-
tion."17 It is clear also that by this time there were concurrent claims
to Taiwan, as the Japanese, for example, felt that they had certain
historical interests in the island.118
These questions were mooted, however, by the cession of Formosa
to Japan. While the Treaty of Shimonoseki would be of dubious
legality in the post-Charter period, since it involved a transfer of
territory by coercive means without regard for other peremptory nor-
mative requirements," 0o from an intertemporal standpoint there can
be no question of its full efficacy. For according to the law prevailing
at the time, peace treaties and, more generally, coerced treaties were
not eo ipso invalid and transfers of territory such as were involved
were common in international law. 2 0 Since there is no factual con-
troversy over the plenary administration of Formosa which the Jap-
anese thereafter introduced into the island, the Treaty of Shimonoseki
marks a total alienation by China of the island of Formosa. The be-
havior of the Chinese government in the post-1895 period provides
extrinsic evidence of the Chinese belief that Formosa was in fact fully
and legally alienated.' 2 ' Behavior of this sort has since been inter-
117. The length of time necessary for permitting other states to protest is, of course,
a matter of context, as was noted above. The critical point, as stated by Judge Huber
in the Island of Palmas, is a period of time affording other states a "reasonable pos-
sibility" to react. Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 867 (1928).
118. See, e.g., S. YEN, supra note 31, at 154-295; TNG-1 Klo, supra note 27, at 11-17.
119. See pp. 654-55 infra.
120. See generally 1 OPPEN r m, supra note 76, at 566 ef seq. and the numerous
older authorities cited there. See also M. MCMAnO.t, Co.NQuESr AND MODEPoi INTErNA-
TioNAr. LAw (1940); 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 76, at 431 et seq. It should be noted
that Japanese title did not derive directly from conquest or subjugation but from a
treaty of peace. The treaty did not involve the debellafio of its adversary, but rather
the cession of certain peripheral territories. In this respect, Shimonoseki was quite a
common and ordinary international event.
121. There may be some significance in the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's special envoy.
Ch'en Yi (then Governor of the Fukien Province and ten years later the first overnor
general of Taiwan), congratulated the Taiwanese at the celebration of the fortieth an-
niversary of Japanese rule of Taiwan on their good fortune in being Japanese citizens.
YU-Hs5ANG FENG, Wuo so JEN SHIH TE CHIANG CHIEH-SHIi (The Chiang Kai-shek I Knew)
42 (1949). Before his diplomatic mission to Taiwan in 1935, Ch'en Yi had sent a delega-
tion of twenty-two headed by Ch'en Ti-ch'eng, Commissioner of Construction and De-
velopment of the Fukien Province, to pay an official visit to Taian to study Japan's
operations and achievements on the island. In the report submitted to Ch'en Yi. TAt-wAN
K'Ao-cH'A PAo-KAo (The Report on the Visit to Taiwan) (1935), Japan's success in Taiwan
was highly acclaimed as a model for building China. The report is particularly revealing
in its candid characterizations of the nationalities of the diverse groups on Taiwan.
According to the report, the total population of the island-state at that time was about
4,900,000. Of that number, five per cent were Japanese, ninety per cent were native
Taiwanese, four per cent were aborigines, and one per cent were overseas Chinese. Id.
at 18. In short, even at that time, the Chinese government itself distinguished Taiwanese
from Chinese.
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preted by the International Court of Justice as estopping subsequent
claims to title.122 In fact, no such claims were lodged by the Ch'ing
government, nor by the Republic of China for nearly thirty years. 1-2
Subsequent norms of international law may, of course, be charac-
terized as retroactive even in a legal area such as territorial title in
which, as we have seen, a high premium is placed on stability of ex-
pectations. 12 4 Thus, the doctrine of unequal treaties125 might be in-
voked retroactively to invalidate Chinese alienation of Formosa in
the Treaty of Shimonoseki and thus to break the chain of title there-
after. We overlook for the moment the questions of the existence,
meaning and scope of application of the doctrine of unequal treaties
in international law and the question of whether, at the time of
Shimonoseki, sufficient "inequalities" characterized the relations of
China and Japan to justify invocation of the doctrine. The salient
point with regard to the doctrine of unequal treaties is that accord-
ing to the intertemporal principles of international territorial law,
a claim lodged subsequently, invoking inequalities at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty, must also validate itself according to subse-
quent international norms which may have emerged.120
Even if a claim of unequal treaties were tenable as law and could
be established as fact, it would probably fail because of intervening
events. In May of 1895, the Taiwanese successfully revolted and estab-
122. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [1962] I.C.J. 6, 19-21, 25, 27,
29, 32-33.
123. See pp. 633-35 infra.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIM-
INALS 974 (1951).
125. The term "unequal treaties" is used rathei' loosely in the recent literature to
refer to all cases in which there were disparities in the relative negotiating positions of
the parties. One notes a tendency to assimilate all of these treaties to the category of
leonine agreements and to characterize them as voidable. Actually the doctrinal reference
of the term "unequal treaties" as used by Chinese international legal scholars was, for
the most part, to the commercial capitulations by China in favor of mercantile powers
and particularly to cessions of extra-territorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., KAISENG Woo. LA
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE Du GOUVERNEMENT NATIONAL DE CHINE ET LA REvIsION DES TAMITES
INEGAUX (1931); see especially the Sino-Japanese Accord of May 6, 1930, id. at 100.01.
Cf. G. SCELLE, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 245 (1948). Scelle refers to the
unequal treaties of China in the same sense. For a review of China's unsuccessful efforts
before the League of Nations, see C. ROUSSEAU, PRINCIpES GENERAUX DU DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIC 621-22 (1944). But cf. W. TUNG, CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS: TtE
IMPAcr OF AND REACTION TO UNEQUAL TREATIES (1970); Lieh Ch'iang Ch'in-Lueh (The
Aggression of Foreign Powers), supra note 116, pt. I, bks 3-6.
As to the more substantial question of the legality of the Treaty of Shimonoseki at
the time of its conclusion, there can be little controversy over the fact that such agree-
ments were then common and lawful. See, e.g., 2 PRADIER-FODERE, TRAITE DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL PUBLIC 496 (1885). For a more contemporary statement, see 1 G. SCItWARZEN-
BERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 147-48 (4th ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARZENBERGER MANUAL].
126. See pp. 604-06 supra.
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lished a Republic. Though the Republic was suppressed by the Jap-
anese within a year, its existence before performance of the Treaty
of Shimonoseki would break Chinese claims according to the perspec-
tive of post-Charter international law by interposing a stronger claim
based on self-determination. 127 The principle of self-determination
and the emergent peremptory norm of anti-colonialism would thus
retroactively defeat China's claim to Taiwan. While these principles
will be discussed in greater detail below, it suffices to mention them
here to indicate the failure of the doctrine of unequal treaties to
establish Chinese tide to Taiwan.
The conclusion of this portion of our search must then be that the
Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 constitutes an effective alienation of
any Chinese rights which might have been acquired in Formosa, and
their transfer to the Japanese Empire.
V. Taiwan Through the World Wars
From the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 until the Second World
War, Japan's sovereignty over Formosa was not internationally con-
tested. Diplomatic correspondence and practice indicate a general
127. Indeed, even according to contemporaneous norms, the interposition of the Re-
public of Taiwan in 1895 probably acted to terminate all Chinese claims to Taiwan.
The factum of abandonment, and then formation of a government by the indigenous
settlers, vests sovereign title in those settlers. Consider Vattel:
If a number of free families, scattered over an independent country, come to unite
for the purpose of forming a nation or state, they altogether acquire the sovcreignty
over the whole country they inhabit: for, they were previously in possession of the
domain-a proportional share of it belonging to each individual family; and since
they are willing to form together a political society, and establish a public authority,
which every member of the society shall be bound to obey, it is evidently their
intention to attribute to that public authority the right of command over the whole
country.
E. DE VATrEL, supra note 93, at § 206. To the same effect, Lindley believed that "a
political society may be formed by the union, for the purposes of government, of a
number of individuals already living in a country with a sovereign." M. LNDLE, supra
note 93, at 88. "[I]f, although all of a large majority of the settlers were subjects of tie
same state, that State definitely refuses to accept or after a reasonable time has not
assumed, international responsibility for the settlement, then, when the settlers haic
developed an efficient government of their own, a new State will have been born." Id.
at 90. (See also I J. WEsrLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LiW ch. 10 (2d ed. 1910)). "If tie settlers
were not subjects of an existing state, a fortiori they will have set up a new one." M.
LI,.DLEY, supra at 90.
Since Japan took control by conquest, suppressing the national uprising. the brief
intervention of the Taiwan Republic may seem of small import. It is extremely impor-
tant in that it sundered Chinese tide without regard to the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
Thus, the denunciation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki by the Kuomintang in 1941 (see
p. 634 infra) could not in itself have revived whatever title China may halc had before
1895, because China forfeited its title by abandonment and the formation of an indigenous
Taiwanese Republic. Under this construction, Shimonoseki was a semantic event, Japan
acquiring a title jure gentium by conquest.
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expectation that Formosa was Japanese.12s Japan, for its part, exercised
an efficient and complete administration on the island. With the out-
break of the war, however, having aligned itself with the Allied Powers
against Japan, China gradually clarified a set of territorial grievances
which the Kuomintang hoped to requite, with the help of the Allies.
In 1941, China proclaimed that all treaties with Japan were abro-
gated .1 2 Though this act was devoid of legality and effect in inter-
national law,130 China pressed its case at meetings of the Allies and
succeeded, at last, in having some of its territorial demands incor.
128. For example, Article 19 of the Treaty of Washington (February 6, 1922) between
the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, limiting naval arnament
provides:
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at
the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval
bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified
hereunder:
(3) the following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean,
to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands,
Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific
Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.
16 AM. J. INT'L L. 41, 46 (Supp. 1922). See also NAOKICHI TANAKA &- TEN-snou "rAt,
supra note 33, at 109-41; A. GRISWOLD, THE FAR EASrERN POLICY OF iHE UNIrrE STATES
305-32 (1st ed. 1938).
129. In its Declaration of War on Japan dated December 12, 1941, China stated:
"The Chinese Government hereby formally declares war on Japan. The Chinese Gov-
ernment further declares that all treaties, conventions, agreements and contracts con-
cerning the relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void." For the
full text, see 5 DEP'T STATE BULL. 506 (1941).
130. The most obvious limitation on unilateral denunciation of a treaty derives from
those international legal norms affecting the party which are juridically independent
of the treaty even though formally incorporated within it. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, art. 43, supra note 8. This provision is obviously a codification of
a general, indeed a necessary, principle of international law. Title vested in Japan at
the time of, and/or because of, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as the language of the Treaty
clearly indicated. Such title, insofar as it is title, ceases to be a bilateral contractual
relationship and becomes a real relationship in international law. Though contract may
be a modality for transferring title, title is not a contractual relationship. Hence once
it vests, it can no longer be susceptible to denunciation by a party to the treaty. In
fact, war probably does not abrogate treaties of territorial settlement. In Society for
the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 494-95 (1823), the
Supreme Court held that "treaties stipulating for permanent rights and general arrange-
ments, and professing to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as well as
the case of peace, do not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, at most, only Sits.
pended while it lasts .... "
A contemporary French view is offered by Rousseau: "[Lia guerre survenant entre les
parties contractantes A un trait6 de rlglement territorial reste sans influence snr les
cessions territoriales antrieurement intervenues en vertu dudit traitZ'." C. ROUSSEAU,
supra note 125, at 571. After a detailed survey, Lord McNair summarizes British practice
to the same effect: "[I]n the British view State rights of a permanent character, con-
nected with sovereignty and status and territory, such as those created or recognized by
a treaty of peace (including rights of independence), a treaty of cession, a boundary
treaty, and so forth, are not affected by the outbreak of war between the contracting
parties." A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 705 (1961). Accord, 2 RiVIER, PRINCII'ES DU DRorr
DES GENS 133 (1896); J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 408-09 (5th ed.
1963). 1 SCHWARZENBERCER MANUAL, supra note 125. Contra, H. BONFILS, MANUEL D!
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 588-89 (3d ed. Frauchille 1901); 2 L. CAVARE, Lr DtotT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POSITIF 175-76 (1962).
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porated in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943,131 which read
in part:
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and
punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves
and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose
that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which
she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World
War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from
the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores,
shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be
expelled from all other territories which she has taken by vio-
lence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of
the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in
due course Korea shall become free and independent.
With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with
those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to
persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to
procure the unconditional surrender of Japan. 132
The Cairo Declaration is not, in the formal sense, a "legal" document.
It was not ratified and, indeed, the missions of the three declarants
probably did not have authorizations to conclude a policy revision
of such scope. The factual errors in the document indicate that the
declarants had not even fully briefed themselves. More importantly,
the interpretations attached to the Declaration subsequently by the
United States and the United Kingdom reinforce the impression that
the Declaration was merely a perorative conclusion to what had been
a planning session for a complex military campaign.1"3
131. The Declaration was issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
132. 9 DEP'T STATE BULL. 393 (1943).
133. In its aide memoire of December 27, 1950, the United States interpreted the
Cairo Declaration in these words:
The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore "Manchuria. Formosa
and the Pescadores to the Republic of China." That Declaration, like other wartime
declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United
States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors
should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put
forward by the Soviet government, that the views of other Allies not represented
at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also, the United States believes that declarations
such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the
United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international
agreement.
DocuMENTs ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1949-1950, at 622-23 (M. Carl)le ed. 1953); 3
,VHrIEMAN DiGEsT, supra note 2, at 511-12 (1964).
The British view was even more unequivocal. Prime Minister Winston Churchill
stated that the Cairo Declaration "contained merely a statement of common purpose."
536 PAR!. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 901 (1955). See also Lauterpacht, The Contemporary
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In general, international lawyers are reluctant to attach enduring
legal significance to wartime declarations precisely because they are
framed as propaganda instruments for short range mobilizations of
support and are rarely attended by intentions of permanent policy
change. The form of an international document is not, however, the
decisive determinant of its validity. The critical question is always
the expectations of the framers which the document is to signify.134
On the other hand, formal factors should not be minimized because
the manifest purpose for which they are introduced is to indicate,
through maximum ceremonialization, that the participants did indeed
intend to commit themselves to a new policy program henceforth
deemed authoritative. Thus the absence of legal formalities in the
Cairo Declaration may itself be taken as a communication of an in-
tention not to create a prescription.
Certain postwar policies were again enunciated by the three major
Allies-the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics-at Potsdam in 1945. The concluding Pots-
Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law: Survey and Comment,
8 INT'L Comp. L.Q. 146, 186 et seq. (1959). For general discussion and appraisal, see
Jain, supra note 2, at 27 et seq.; Chen, supra note 3, at 131-36; No, supra note 3, at 26-36.
George F. Kennan observed:
No one seems to know from what deliberations this declaration [Cairo] issued, it
was apparently drafted, at the moment, by Harry Hopkins, after consultation only
with the President and the Chinese visitors. Of all the acts of American statesman-
ship in this unhappy chapter, the issuance of this declaration, which is so rarely
criticized, seems to me to have been the most unfortunate in its consequences. The
other direct results of this phase of American statesmanship have either been erased
by subsequent events or seem to have produced, at least, no wholly calamitous after
effects to date; but this thoughtless tossing to China of a heavily inhabited and
strategically important island which had not belonged to it in recent decades, and
particularly the taking of this step before we had any idea of what the futttre
China was going to be like, and without any consultation of the wishes of the
inhabitants of the island, produced a situation which today represents a major
embarrassment to United States policy, and constitutes one of the great danger spots
of the postwar world.
G. KENNAN, RUSSIA AND TiE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN 376-77 (1960).
George H. Kerr also wrote:
This [the Cairo Declaration] was not a carefully prepared State Paper but rather
a promise to divide the spoils, dangled before the wavering Chinese. It was a
declaration of intent, promising a redistribution of territories held by the Japanese.
None of the territories mentioned in the document were at that moment in Allied
hands. The Allied leaders had to show a bold face before the world, but in truth
no one then knew what ultimate course the war might take. . . . It is difficult now
to understand the offhand manner in which the Conference produced the document.
* . . For whatever reason, the Cairo Declaration is as noteworthy for historical inac.
curacies within the text as for its rhetorical flourishes. The latter made good
propaganda, but the former set a dangerous trap. Some of the damage to American
interests will never be repaired.
G. KERR, supra note 2, at 25-26.
134. M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE 39 et seq. (1967).
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dam Declaration of July 26, 1945, contained, in Section eight, a con-
firmation of the Cairo Declaration:
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Jap-
anese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu,
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we deter-
mine.13 5
Most of the reservations raised in regard to the Cairo Declaration
would apply once again here.
The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are not, of course, meaning-
less, for they patently communicated something. It remains to assess,
for our purposes, the content and intensity of that communication,
and whether the expectations generated thereby may be said to have
created an international tide. In particular, we must ask whether or
not they conformed to temporally relevant international norms. A
number of lines of reasoning press us to the conclusion that Cairo
and Potsdam did not, indeed could not, create an international tide,
but at most a sort of jus ad rem, a claim on other Allies to participate
at some future time in the perfection of a title in conformity with
the law.
The primary reasons why Cairo and Potsdam could not create inter-
national title stem from (i) the capacity of the declarants and (ii)
the environing international norms which prevailed at the time. As
to the capacity of the declarants, three states were simply not em-
powered under the principles and peremptory procedures of the
Covenant of the League of Nations then in force, to decide that the
territory held, and formerly recognized as validly so held by another,
could now be forcibly removed from that state.130 Such incapacity
could not be cured by the allegation that the territories to be trans-
ferred were in fact "stolen," unless and until that allegation was estab-
135. 13 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 137 (1945).
136. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, preamble: "[T]he maintenance of justice and
a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with
one another." Note also that the Covenant in its inventory of penalties for non.compli-
ance, makes no mention whatsoever of territorial disruptions. Id. arL 16. See J. YNuDSON.
A HisroRY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIoNs 873-83 (1938). See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J.,
Spec. Supp. No. 101, at 87-88 (1932). Even prior to the Covenant, a conspiracy among
two or three states to dismember another state could not co ipso be a ground for title.
If title vested at all, it vested by a subsequent successful conquest. Cf. I Oppr.imrz.,
supra note 76, at 566 et seq. As to the purported lawfulness of such an act after 1919. see
Briggs, Non-Recognition of Title by Conquest and Limitations on the Doctrine, 1940
PROGrmINs Amr. Soc. INT'L L. 72 et seq.
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lished authoritatively under the principles and procedures of the
Covenant. It follows that while Cairo might have validly established
longer range trilateral territorial intentions, it could not establish
title, because under international law the parties to it lacked the
capacity to do this.
As to environing international norms, it is sufficient to note that
the doctrines of self-determination 3 7 and the prohibition of use of
force for territorial changes, 138 as embodied in many resolutions of
organs of the League of Nations, 39 had transformed the component
of acquiescence of the indigenous people into a peremptory aspect,
and a virtual requirement of lawful transfers of territorial title. 40
Hence, even assuming that the Cairo Declaration, as reinforced by
the Potsdam Declaration, had been intended by the parties to it to
create new international rights, such an intention would have been
limited by international law. Jure gentium, the Cairo Declaration
could mean only that the participants agreed to recognize a Chinese
acquisition of Formosa if the inhabitants of Formosa indicated that
137. See generally Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971); .
JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS (1969); T. Mensah,
Self-Determination Under the Auspices of the United Nations, 1964 (unpublished J.S.D.
dissertation in Yale Law Library); R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN TIlE
ERA OF DECOLONIZATION (Harvard University Occasional Papers in International Affairs,
No. 9, 1964); Emerson, Colonialism, Political Development and the United Nations, 19
INT'L ORG. 484 (1965); M. SHUKRI, THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN TIlE UNITED
NATIONS (1965); UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH, STATUS AND
PROBLEMS OF VERY SMALL STATES AND TERRITORIES (UNITAR Series No. 3 1969); Report
of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Cooperation Among States, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 19, at 41-52, U.N. Doe.
A/8018 (1970); P. BLAIR, THE MINISTATE DILEMMA (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Occasional Paper No. 6, 1967); W. BRISK, ANGUILLA AND TIlE MINI-STATE DILEMMA
(New York Univ. Center for International Studies Policy Paper, No. 5, 1969); CHEN &
LASSWELL, supra note 2, ch. 2; Connor, Self-Determination: the New Phase, 20 WORLD
POLITICS 30 (1967); UNITED NATIONS, PROTECTION OF MINORITIES (1967); V. VAN DYxE,
supra note 7, at 77-102; I. CLAUDE, NATIONAL MINORITIES, AN INTERNATIONAL PROULEM
(1955); Jessup, Self-Determination Today in Principle and in Practice, 33 VA. Q. REV.
174 (1957); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, TIlE UNITED NATIONS AND
DECOLONIZATION (1965); R. EMERsON, FROM EMI-iRE TO NATION: THE Rise TO SELF
AssERTION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES (1960); J. PLAMENATZ, ON ALIEN RULE AND
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1960); Rivlin, Self-Determination and Dependent Areas, 501 INT'L
CONCILIATION (1955); L. SNYDER, THE NEW NATIONALISM (1968); Eagleton, Excesses of
Self-Determination, 31 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 592 (1953).
138. Such a prohibition is expressed in: The Treaty for the Renunciation of War
(Kellogg-Briand Pact), 46 Stat. 2343 (1928), 94 L.N.T.S. 57; the Stimson Doctrine, U.S.
Dep't State pub. 2008, 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TIlE UNITED
STATES, JAPAN: 1931-1941 at 76 (1943). Cf. R. LANGER, SEIZURE OF TERRITORY (1947); Brlggs,
supra note 136, at 72-82, 82-99.
139. For example, on March 11, 1932, the Assembly of the League of Nations resolved
that "it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any
situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to tile
Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris." LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J.,
Spec. Supp. 101, at 87-88 (1932).
140. See pp. 601-04 supra and pp. 654-59 infra.
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they desired to be part of or to be governed by China. In short, Japan
remained the sovereign of Formosa despite the declarations of Cairo
and Potsdam. All the while, of course, Japan continued to govern
Taiwan.
VI. Taiwan Under Post-War Occupation
According to pre-agreements, the Japanese forces in Formosa and
China, except Manchuria, surrendered to the forces of Chiang Kai-
shek, who acted as the trustee of the Allied Forces under the direc-
tion of General MacArthur.141 Nationalist Chinese have since inti-
mated that this gave rise to title by conquest. Even if conquest sur-
vived the emergent doctrine of self-determination, the Chinese claim
would be factually ludicrous.
A large scale Formosan uprising against Chiang's forces in 1947
dramatized the depth of Formosan hostility to the new invaders. 1 2
In 1949, the remnants of Chiang's army, decisively defeated by the
Communists, fled across the Formosa Straits to Taiwan. Chiang,
though no longer President of China, 43 declared himself President
of the Republic of China and spoke grandly of "recovering" the main-
land from the rebels. In addition to Chiang's claim, an authorized
representative of the People's Republic of China asserted before the
Security Council that taking control of Taiwan in 1945 rendered
it "not only de jure, but also de facto, an inalienable part of Chinese
territory."'' 44 Hence the juridical effect of Chiang's actions as regards
title must be scrutinized.
Cairo and Potsdam, as we have seen, could not, even if they so
intended, have effected a transfer of sovereignty of Taiwan jure
gentium, because the parties lacked the capacity to perform such an
act and because such an act would itself have been contrary to the
international norms then prevailing. Indeed, there was no such inten-
tion on the part of the United States. Hence one cannot argue, as
China has done, that title was transferred de jure in 1943, and was
perfected by securing effective control in 1945. Title was not trans-
ferred in 1943; Japan continued to hold it.
141. See p. 611 and note 43 supra.
142. See p. 612 and notes 44-46 supra.
143. See pp. 612-15 supra.
144. 5 U.N. SCOR, 527th meeting 2, 6 (1950) (r mark of Wu Shiu.Chuan).
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The fact that Japan did not suffer debellatio (confirmed by Allied
and Japanese behavior after 1945), the Peace Treaty itself in 1951
and the writings of doctrinalists"a0 render moot the question of
whether Taiwan would have become a res nullius in international
law, available to whomever could secure it first. Even if Japan had
suffered a debellatio, peremptory international norms which had al-
ready been prescribed would have terminated the concept of res nullils
in international law as regards any populated territory.140 Finally,
Japan surrendered to the Allies and not to China; Chiang occupied
Taiwan only as their agent.147 Hence the mere fact that China seized
control of Taiwan could not secure it a title jure gentium.
That the act of securing control of Taiwan in 1945 was a mandate
of trust by the Allied Powers is clear from contemporaneous docu-
ments, from authentic interpretations of them by the drafters them-
selves in the following years, and from the terms of the Peace Treaty
with Japan. Governmental agencies of the Allied Powers at a number
of levels consistently confirmed by word and deed the continuation
of Japanese sovereignty over Taiwan.148 Consistent with that position,
allied officials also affirmed Chinese "authority" over Taiwan, 140 but
did not state ex cathedra or otherwise that China had "sovereignty"
over Taiwan. The significance of this consistency is heightened by
the fact that, throughout this period, Chiang's government pursued
a major propaganda and lobbying campaign in order to secure an
overt recognition of sovereignty from the Allied Powers. 150 None was
145. On debellatio in general, see 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 76, at 441.42. Professor
Scelle argued that debellatio was little more than belligerent occupation and rejected
the more general theory, as being based on uncertain practice G. SCELLE, supra note
125, at 141-43. This seems to have been the sense in which the term was used in regard
to the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich. But cf. Kelsen, The Legal Status of
Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 518 (1945). For
specific discussion of the alleged debellatio of Japan, see 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 76,
at 447.
146. See pp. 655-60 infra.
147. See p. 611 supra.
148. For an extremely clear example see Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Chennault, 17
I.L.R. 173 (Hong Kong Supreme Court 1950). See also Cheng Fu Sheng and Lin Fu Mel
v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959); United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 F.
Supp. 145 (D. Hawaii 1954); G. SCUWARZENBERGER, supra note 8, at 272-73; O'Connell,
The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem, 50 AM. J. INT'L L, 405
(1956); 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 76, at 446.
149. See, e.g., Remarks by Secretary of State Acheson, January 5, 1950, 22 DEPIT STATr
BULL. 79 (1950). Note that Acheson's statement used the word "authority" and not"sovereignty."
150. For a penetrating account of Chiang's intensive and extensive lobbying activities
and blackmail tactics in connection with the Cairo Declaration, see B. TUCIIMAN, STILAVELL
AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, 1911-45, at 396-414 (1971). Concerning Chlang's
China lobby in the U.S., see CHEN & LASSWELL, supra note 2, at 200-05; ACTIVITIES OF NON.
DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN PRINCIPALS IN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON
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forthcoming. Thus, the Chinese argument of quasi-estoppel or pre-
scriptive acquisition, to the effect that title was secured through the
absence of protest, is factually incorrect. Every rebuff to Chiang's
efforts showed clearly that the understanding and expectation of mem-
bers of the international community were that China had not acquired
Taiwan jure gentium. Moreover, while the continuous martial law
within the island did indeed suppress overt dissent, by its very opera-
tion it indicated the hostility of the Taiwanese to the Chinese gov-
ernment.
VII. The Peace Treaty with Japan and Suspension of Taiwan's Status
The Peace Treaty with Japan was concluded at an international
conference in San Francisco in 1951, after eleven months of discus-
sion.1-l Some mention of intervening political events must first be
made, however, for without such references a number of trends cannot
be comprehended.
After Mao Tse-tung's forces secured control over the Chinese main-
land and Chiang fled with the remnants of his army to Formosa, a
number of states in the West, including some former Allies, refused
to recognize the finality of the Communist victory. Others, accom-
modating themselves to change, still sought to extend some form of
credence to Chiang's continuing pretensions without actually inter-
vening in the civil conflict. 152
With the outbreak of the Korean War and the roughly symmetrical
commitments of Communist China and the United States on opposing
sides, it suddenly became inexpedient for Western states to jeopardize
Chiang's position on Formosa. The new military theatre ascribed
A HEARING BEFORE THE ComsmiTTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 86th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1963);
Wertenbaker, The China Lobby, Part I, THE REPoRTr, Apr. 15. 1952, at 4-.24. and Apr.
29, 1952, at 19-22 and Horton, China Lobby, Part 11, ThE REPORTER. Apr. 29. 1932.
at 5-19; F. GREENE, A CURTAIN OF IGNORANCE (1964); A. STEELE, THE AmwucmN PEOPLE
AND CHINA (1966). The pro-Chiang interests were able to accomplish the singular feat
of suppression of a book exposing their activities. A comprehensive study entitled
THE CHINA LOBBY IN AMiERICAN POLrics, written by Dr. Ross Koen and published by
Macmillan in 1960, was officially withdrawn for unexplained reasons after distribttion
of some advance copies. For details of the entire episode see Koen, Two Postscripts to
the McCarran Hearings, BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS, May 1969, at 27-31.
151. See CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF THE Tp.zAY OF PEACE
WITH JAPAN: RECORD OF PROCEEDINCS (Dep't of State Pub. 4392, 1951) [hereinafter cited
as JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE RECORD].
152. See CHEN & LAsV.ELL, supra note 2, at 28-33; Erasmus, General de Gaulles
Recognition of Peking, 18 CHINA Q. 195 (1964); Slawecki, The Two Chinas in Africa,
41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 398 (1963); Yu, Peking Versus Taipei in the Wlorld Arena: Chinese
Competition in Africa, 3 ASIAN SURVEY 439 (1963).
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some strategic relevance to Chiang's battered and persistently ineffec-
tive army. Hence his claims to legitimacy, which might otherwise
have bordered on the ridiculous, were transformed into a useful inter-
national strategy for other states in a number of different arenas.
U.N. characterization of Communist China as an aggressor further
improved Chiang's stature. 15a This concatenation of factors produced
a strange stabilization. Surprisingly, no state was willing to go so far
as to concede Chinese sovereignty over Formosa, despite an intense
lobbying campaign carried on by Chiang's government in a number
of capitals. On the other hand, these same states were unwilling to
pursue the inexorable conclusions which should have followed the
absence of sovereignty. Instead, the general policy became one of sim-
ply "freezing" the issue.
The pattern was set in the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951.154 Article
2 of that instrument recorded, inter alia, that
Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the
Pescadores.
While Article 2 unquestionably alienates Japanese sovereignty over
Taiwan, it does not indicate to whom sovereignty then passed. The
153. G.A. Res. 498, 5 U.N. GAOR, Snpp. 20A, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/1775/Add. 1
(1951) read in part: "The General Assembly . . . finds that the Central People's Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those
who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against
United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea."
154. [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3169; T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 46 (1952); JAPANESE PVAcE
CONFERENCE RECORD, supra note 151, at 313-90. The legal significance of the Peace
Treaty with Japan in regard to the status of Taiwan cannot be overemphasized:
The initial desire of the four major Allied powers (China, U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R.) to
restore Formosa and the Pescadores to China, expressed in the Cairo Declaration of
1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the Japanese Term of Surrender of
1945, was made at a time when a full-scale war was in progress and Formosa was
ruled by Japan. It is surely too much to expect decision makers acting in such
circumstances to take a balanced view of all relevant contextual factors, particularly
long-term considerations. To be authoritative and effective, a preliminary commit.
ment of this kind would have to be crystallized and incorporated into the peace
treaty that terminates hostilities. Here the pertinent agreement is the peace treaty
with Japan of 1951, which authoritatively formulates the common policies of Japan
and the Allied powers regarding their mutual relations after the termination oi war.
International law has long recognized the fundamental importance of peace treaties
to delimit the state of affairs between victorious and defeated powers. Only com-
mitments made in an atmosphere free of active violence can consider other than
military necessities and hence provide a reasonable basis for peace and stability.
Despite the numerous declarations made by the major Allied powers in the heat of
war, the adjustment of the new structure of relations must be based on the relevant
provisions in peace treaties in which both defeated and victorious nations partici-
pated. In a peace treaty the territorial clauses are drafted with particular care to
prevent subsequent allegations of ambiguity. Since territorial claims are among
the principal sources of conflict in world affairs, it is well recognized that who
renounces what, to whom, and when is to be stated in unequivocal terms.
CHEN & LASsWELL, supra note 2, at 127-28.
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amalgam of legal and political considerations which accounted for
this anomaly was quite candidly analyzed by the representative of tie
United Kingdom at the Conference:
The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty
over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does
not determine the future of these islands. The future of Formosa
was referred to in the Cairo Declaration but that declaration also
contained provisions in respect to Korea together with tie basic
principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambitions. Until
China shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and
principles, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the
problem of Formosa. In due course a solution must be found, in
accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of tie
United Nations. In the meantime, however, it would be wrong
to postpone making peace with Japan. We therefore came to tie
conclusion that the proper treatment of Formosa in tie context
of the Japanese peace treaty was for the treaty to provide only
for renunciation of Japanese sovereignty. 1 i
Communist bloc states at the Conference insisted that Formosa was
de jure and de facto Chinese territory because of the Cairo and Pots-
dam Declarations and because of the effective control exercised there
by Chinese since 1945.15 One answer to this, put in the record by
Nicaragua, implied that Chinese action in Korea, whose independence
had also been assured by the Cairo Declaration, involved a frustration
or at least suspension of the Cairo Declaration, that instrument being
construed as "indivisible per se."'1 Other nations chose to construe
the suspensive effect of Article 2 differently. The Egyptian representa-
tive, for example, stated:
My government trusts that the reason behind this omission is to
afford the opportunity to deal with this question in accordance
with the United Nations Charter, taking into consideration the
principle of self-determination and the expressed desire of the
inhabitants of these territories.1 8
While the candor of certain participants at the Peace Conference
provides a whiff of the exotic blend of political motives, this latter
position correctly expressed the international legal position. Even
155. JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE REcoRD, supra note 151, at 93.
156. Id. at 175-78, 270-71.
157. Id. at 212-13.
158. Id. at 144.
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assuming that Cairo and Potsdam were "law creating instruments"
as regards Formosa, they could not be used to perfect an incomplete
title after 1945 unless they conformed to the obligations assumed un-
der the United Nations Charter. For the intervention of the Charter,
with its supremacy clause in Article 103,159 introduced intertemporal
normative requirements which Cairo and Potsdam did not fulfill.100
The post-Charter principles will be considered in the following sec-
tion. For the moment, we note only that the correct international
legal interpretation of Article 2 of the Peace Treaty was until recently
confirmed by the subsequent practice of states.
Until the Nixon-Kissinger ddmarche, United States practice fol-
lowed the Peace Treaty scrupulously. Thus, Article VI of the Mutual
Defense Treaty between-Nationalist China and the United States stipu-
lates that "the terms territorial and 'territories' (in Articles II and
V) shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the
Pescadores" and "such other territories as may be determined by
mutual agreement."'" 1 In order to avoid creating the misconception
that this defense treaty constituted in any way an implied recognition
of China's sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores, the United
States Senate, in the course of ratification, stated that
it is the understanding of the Senate that nothing in the present
treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status
or the sovereignty of the territories referred to in Article VI [i.e.,
Formosa and the Pescadores]. 1 2
The legal status of Formosa, as understood by the Senate, had on
a previous occasion been clarified by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles. At the signing of the defense treaty during the first offshore
islands crisis, he said:
[T]echnical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has
never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty
merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to
these islands. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese
peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was
159. Article 103 provides that "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail." Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30, supra note 8,
160. See pp. 603-05 supra.
161. See note 57 supra.
162. See note 58 supra.
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concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore,
the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores,
is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands [Que-
moy and Matsu] which have always been Chinese territory.163
This position was reaffirmed as recently as April 28, 1971,104 though
the Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972, would seem to signal
a change in the American stance.
Shortly after French recognition of the People's Republic of China
on January 27, 1964, President Georges Pompidou, then premier, took
pains to make clear that the act of recognition in no way implied
French acquiescence in Peking's territorial claim over Formosa. In
Pompidou's view, "Formosa (Taiwan) was detached from Japan, but
it was not attached to anyone" under the Peace Treaty with Japan.
Hence Formosa's undetermined status "must be decided one of these
days, taking the wishes of the Formosa population into considera-
tion."'6 5
In recent years, when voting to seat Peking in the U.N., the British
delegation had made it a practice to reiterate simultaneously its posi-
tion on Formosa:
Sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined. It there-
fore follows, in our view, that the question of who should repre-
sent Formosa in the United Nations is also undetermined. The
vote which I shall cast in favour of the substantive draft resolu-
tion does not prejudice the position of my Government on this
point.166
Both the Canadian and Italian governments merely "took note" of
Peking's claim over Taiwan in their respective joint diplomatic com-
muniques with the People's Republic of China, despite Peking's in-
sistence that they "recognize" Taiwan as a part of China. 0 7 An in-
163. 31 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 896 (1954).
164. Washington Post, Apr. 29, 1971, at A14, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,
1971, at 4, col. 4.
165. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1964. at 4, col. 4. See also Editorial, Sell-Deterininalion for
Taiwan, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1964, at 36, col. 2 (supporting Pompidou's statement).
166. 21 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1481, at 9 (1966). But see the radical reversal
of the British position regarding Taiwan's status after the Shanghai communique. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.).
167. The full text of the joint communique between China and Canada issued on
October 13, 1970 reads as follows:
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of
Canada, in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignt) and
territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and equality
and mutual benefit, have decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment
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creasing number of governments have recently adopted this position.105
The official position of the Japanese government conforms to the
terms of the Peace Treaty, i.e., that sovereignty over Taiwan was re-
linquished but not authoritatively transferred to another state.10 0 The
Indian position, in contrast, has leaned toward the cession of Formosa
to China.170 It is possible that this position may have changed, because
there are serious historical errors in statements made by Nehru and
Menon, to which Indian scholars have brought attention.1 71 Ireland
has consistently stated that Taiwan's international status remains un-
determinedl?2 A perusal of the voting record of the Afro-Asian bloc
on the Chinese representation question in the United Nations sug-
gests, by its very lack of pattern, that the views of African and Asian
states on this matter are quite fluid, dictated by transient international
of diplomatic relations, effective 13 October 1970.
The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the
territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note
of this position of the Chinese Government.
The Canadian Government recognizes the Government of the People's Republic
of China as the sole legal government of China.
The Chinese Government and the Canadian Government have agreed to exchange
ambassadors within six months, and to provide all necessary assistance for the estab.
lishment and the performance of the functions of diplomatic missions in their re-
spective capitals on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with
international practice.
Renmin Ribao, Welcome the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and
Canada, PEKING REv., Oct. 16, 1970, at 12-13. See also id., Nov. 13, 1970, at 6 (China
and Italy).
168. This position was adopted by Chile, Belgium and Lebanon when they established
diplomatic relations with China. See 'EKING Rv., Jan. 8, 1971, at 3 (China and Chile)
id., Oct. 29, 1971, at 4 (China and Belgium); id., Nov. 19, 1971, at 3 (China and Lebanon).
Another formula adopted recently makes no mention of Taiwan in joint communlques:
"The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria recognizes the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government representing the entire Chinese
people." PEKING REV., Feb. 19, 1971, at 5. This formula was followed in the following
cases: Kuwait, id., Apr. 2, 1971, at 16; Cameroon, id., Apr. 9, 1971, at 9; Austria, id.,
June 4, 1971, at 11; Sierra Leone, id., Aug. 6, 1971, at 22; Turkey, id, Aug. 13, 1971, at
6; Iran, id., Aug. 20, 1971, at 4; Rwanda, id., Nov. 19, 1971, at 4.
169. The Japanese government has phrased with particular care its official position
on Formosa's status. For example, in 1966 its representative to the U.N., Akira Matsul,
stated:
At the end of the last century, Taiwan was ceded from China to Japan by virtue
of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1895, and remained tinder Japanese jurisdic.
tion for half a century. In the peace treaty signed at San Francisco between Japan
and the Allied Powers on 8 September 1951, Japan renounced all rights, title and
claim to Taiwan and the neighbouring Pescadores Islands. In 1952 a peace treaty
was concluded at Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China, the representative
of which had signed the Charter of the United Nations, and a close and friendly
contact has been maintained between the two countries ever since. At the present
time, Taiwan, with a population of over 12 million people, is the seat of tile
Government of the Republic of China. The People's Republic of China has never
extended its control to the island of Taiwan.
21 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1479, at 2 (1966). But see N.Y. Times, supra note 72
(remarks of Premier Sato).
170. See Jain, supra note 2, at 39-42.
171. Id.
172. E.g., 21 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1479, at 1 (1966).
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political issues rather than by a considered position on the Taiwan
question.173 The reasoning of the Communist states has followed that
of China.17 4 Of late, however, there have been rumors of diplomatic
contacts between the Nationalist Chinese and the Soviet Union and
a change in Soviet policy should not be ruled out.'70
VIII. Current Chinese Claims to Title
A number of other material claims to Chinese sovereignty over
Taiwan can be abstracted from recent press statements of Chinese
political leaders.' 7 6 Claims based on three implicit doctrines have
been presented, as well as a procedural claim invoking domestic juris-
diction. We consider the jurisdictional point first and then the ma-
terial claims.
A. Domestic Jurisdiction
Statements attributed in the past year to Premier Chou En-lai assert
that the disposition of Taiwan is a matter of domestic jurisdiction, to
be decided among the parties themselves.177 After Dr. Kissinger's first
173. See Cnax, & LAssw.L, supra note 2, at 30-33, 47-49.
174. In the course of the debates on the question of Chinese participation in the
United Nations, various delegations have touched upon the issue of Taiwmn's legal status,
but in a terse, curt and selective manner. Many of Peking's supporters have tended to
play up the importance of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, but have failed to
mention, deliberately or otherwise, the Japanese Peace Treat) of 1951 as well as the
Atlantic Charter. See, e.g., the U.S.S.R.'s statement: "As far as the island of Taiwan is
concerned, as is well known, it is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China-
it is a province of China. The fact of the return of Taiwan to China after the Second
World War is enshrined in the most important international documents: in the Cairo and
Potsdam Declaration." 26 U.N. GAOR (provisional), U.N. Doe. A/PV.1971, at 8 (1971):
Chile's statement: "Taiwan is a province of China and the great allied Powers at the end
of the Second World War resolved that Taiwan should be returned to China. That was
confirmed in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and in the Potsdam Declaration of 1943.
Id. at 56; Algeria's statement: "[T]he island of Formosa is an integral part of Chinese
national territory, and for that, it would not even be necessary to recall the declarations
of Cairo in 1943 and Potsdam in 1945 in which the Allies of the Second World War
confirmed that Formosa belongs to China." 26 U.N. GAOR (provisional), U.N. Doe.
A/PV.1966, at 31 (1971). See also F. MoRtE.o, supra note 2, at 32-35.
175. Most recently, Pravda charged that China had encouraged expansion of US.
aggression in Indochina through a deal in which "Washington would 'find a form of
recognition' of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan while Peking would help to 'pacif)'
Vietnam." N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1971, at 2, col. 3 (city ed.). On the other hand, Peking
accused the Soviet Union of "stepping up flirtation and collusion" with the Chinese
Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Id., Mar. 27, 1972, at 11, col. 1 (city ed.).
176. See note 3 supra.
177. A typical statement runs as follows:
Taiwan is a province of China and it is an inalienable part of China's territory.
And after the Second World War Taiwan had already been restored to China. And
the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people is an internal affair of China which
brooks no foreign intervention.
Interview with Chou En-lai, supra note 3, at 43-44. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971,
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secret visit to China, White House personnel began to adhere to this
construction of the problem. In December 1971, Dr. Kissinger an-
nounced that the ultimate disposition of Taiwan was to be a matter
for China and Taiwan to decide."8 President Nixon adopted the
same position in his "State of the World" message on February 9,
1972,179 and in the Shanghai communique of February 27, 1972, the
United States and China agreed to the artful formulation that
all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is
but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United
States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms
its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese themselves.' 80
The claim of domestic jurisdiction is an assertion of national elites
that a particular matter in which another state or states or an inter-
national organization has taken an interest is nonetheless solely a
concern of their own state. Both the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions as well as the United Nations Charter include express provisions
for domestic jurisdiction.""' Procedures for establishing whether a
matter is one of domestic jurisdiction involve perusal of normative
expectations and inclusive community requirements. In the Tunis
Morocco Nationality Decrees case, the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice concluded:
The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within
the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it
depends upon the development of international relations.182
The conclusion that the status of Taiwan is a matter of international
concern and not of domestic jurisdiction is based on many grounds.
First, a matter which involves the interpretation of a treaty is al-
ways a matter of international concern. In the Right of Passage case,
the International Court of Justice perfected its jurisdiction and re-
at 1, cal. 6 and at 5, cal. 3 (statement by Dr. Kissinger); id., Dec. 2, 1971, at 14, cal, 4;
Mike Mansfield, The Mission to Peking, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971, § E, at 11, cal. 3
(city ed.). But see Letter to the Editor by Chen. The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 22,
1971, at 14, cal. 6; Chicago Tribune, Dec. 20, 1971, § 1, at 18, cal. 5.
178. See pp. 618-19 supra; N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 1, cols. 3, 5 & 6; Dec. 2, 1971,
at 19, cal. 1.
179. See note 69 supra.
180. Id., Feb. 28, 1972, at 16, cols. 3 & 5 (city ed.).
181. COVENANT art. 15(8); CHARTER art. 2(7).
182. [1923] P.CJ.J., ser. B, No. 4, at 23-24.
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jected India's claim of domestic jurisdiction, because Portugal invoked
a treaty which India controverted. The court held that
to invoke, whether rightly or wrongly, such principles is to place
oneself on the plane of international law .... To decide upon
the validity of those principles ... does not fall exclusively within
the jurisdiction of India. 8 3
Since the disposition of Taiwan turns on the construction of the
Japanese Peace Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, it is
perforce a matter of international concern and not of domestic juris-
diction.
Second, a case of territorial conflict is always a matter of inter-
national concern. Territorial disputants invariably assert domestic
jurisdiction as a means of winning their case procedurally, though
the claim is never sustained.184 Taiwan is in great part a territorial
issue. The claim of Chinese domestic jurisdiction, therefore, begs the
entire question, for if the issue is title over Taiwan, one cannot invoke
domestic jurisdiction until one has affirmatively established that Tai-
wan is part of China.
Third, any case which might "threaten the peace," in the language
of the Charter, is assimilated to the category of international concern
and ceases to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction."-' Since the dis-
position of Taiwan can indeed threaten the peace, it must be a mat-
ter of international concern. 8 0
Fourth, according to the most recent decision of the International
Court of Justice, matters involving self-determination of peoples
183. [1957] I.CJ. 125, 150.
184. In these contexts, the claim of domestic jurisdiction is synonymous with the
assertion of sovereignty over the disputed territory; the matter is internationalized by
the very fact of the dispute. Note, however, that even if one disputant's claim over the
territory in question is upheld, the conflict itself may nonetheless constitute a "threat
to peace" and- thus a matter of international concern.
185. This express proviso is an authentic component of Article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter, but even if it had not been included, it necessarily would have been implied
as a requisite component of community order. Article 2(7) concludes with tie phrase
that the principle of domestic jurisdiction "shall not prejudice the application of en-
forcement measures under Chapter VII." The enforcement measures of Chapter VII. in
turn, have required, under the strict language of the Charter, a finding by the Security
Council of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression."
186. The implications for overt violence in the forced transfer of a state of fifteen
million people, who are industrialized and in a state of intense military readiness, require
no further explication. The grievous human rights deprivations which would be involved
in the forced transfer of such a community may also constitute a threat to the peace
and as a result comprise a matter of international concern. See generally McDougal &
Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern,
62 A-,si. J. l"r'L L. 1 (1968).
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are of international concern. 187 Because this is a central issue of the Tai-
wan problem, a claim of domestic jurisdiction cannot be sustained.188
Fifth, cases of nationality of individuals and groups are now con-
sidered matters of international concern. In 1923, to be sure, the
Permanent Court of International Justice held that nationality ques-
tions were reserved for domestic jurisdiction,189 but the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,190 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,' 9 ' the International Court's decision in the
Nottebohm case' 92 and the Flegenheimer case'0 3 indicate that questions
of nationality have been internationalized. Because much of the Tai.
wanese question turns on nationality assertions, the case must be
considered one of international concern.
There are, to be sure, domestic issues involved in the Taiwan ques-
tion. Chiang Kai-shek identifies himself as Chinese and is so perceived
by his enemies on the mainland. Certain agreements between Mao
and Chiang might thus be considered domestic matters. While there
are doubtless many issues which Mao and Chiang could settle in pri-
vate, the disposition of Taiwan itself could not be one of them. This,
as we have seen, is a matter of international concern.
B. Claims of Racial Suzerainty
Another argument made by and on behalf of China asserts that the
thirteen million Taiwanese are really Chinese and hence are subject to
Chinese sovereignty. In 1971, for example, Chou En-lai stated:
We are resolutely opposed to the so-called "Taiwan Independence
movement." Because the people in Taiwan are Chinese. Taiwan
was originally a province of China. And a thousand years ago it
had already become a part of China. The dialect spoken in Taiwan
is the same dialect spoken in the area around Amoy in Fukien
province. 94
187. [1971] I.C.J. 16, especially at 32-34.
188. See notes 209-14 infra.
189. [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4, at 24.
190. GA. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).
191. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
192. [1953] I.C.J. 111; [19551 I.C.J. 4.
193. United States ex rel. Flegenheimer v. Italy, Italian-United States Conciliation
Comm'n, 14 U.N.R.I.A.A. 327 (1958).
194. Interview with Chou En.lai, supra note 3, at 44. The facts are somewhat differ.
ent from that represented in this statement. The Nationality Act of 1929 of the Republic
of China (ROC) which is still in force in Taiwan extends citizenship jure sanguins and
makes it extremely difficult for a Chinese to divest himself of his nationality. UNITED
NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY 94 (1954). See also CoNsri.
TUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF TIlE REPUIBLIC
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A comparable position was adopted in the United States-Chinese com-
munique of February 27, 1972. The United States there "acknowl-
edged" that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain
there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." 1°  This
formulation can readily be seen as nothing more than an artful variant
of the domestic jurisdiction argument, invoking a racial instead of a
territorial community.
In the mid-nineteenth century, a doctrine of racial nationality sur-
faced in international law as a complement to the jurisprudence of
historicism. 10 It seems obvious that where oppressive conditions
force the contraction of identifications to racial and linguistic groups,
racial claims for political status can be expected 0 7 and positive inter-
national responses to them may be the only fair solution. Attribu-
tions of nationality and hence political subjection by others, however,
conflict sharply with the increasingly vigorous democratic trend in
international law.108 For this reason, there is no contemporary doc-
trine of racial suzerainty, no theory which allows self-selected leaders
OF CHINA 3 (1967). The 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
follows the same pattern, referring in Article 98 to "Chinese residents abroad" who
would, under Article 23, elect deputies to the National People's Congress. V. PutCELL,
supra note 94, at xiii-xiv. We have not been able to determine the extent to and manner
in which Article 98 has been implemented. According to a statement made by Chou
En-lai on September 23, 1954, the PRC seemed to continue to view ovCrseas Chinese as
PRC nationals until bilateral treaties with each host country had been made. The
Nationalist Chinese countered this move a month later by announcing that overseas
Chinese were not considered Chinese nationals if they acquired the citizenship of another
country. Id. at 482-83. In fact, both the PRO and the ROG have been quite erratic in
protesting and acting on behalf of oppressed Chinese in Southeast Asia. See generally
V. PURCELL, supra; CHENG-.MING HUANG,.TitE LEGAL STATUS OF Tie CtuiNsE AroAD (1934);
SHIH-JU CH'IU, HUA-CHIAO KUO-CHIH WEN-TI (rhe Question of Nationality of the O~erscas
Chinese) (1966); L. VILLAMS, THE FUTruE OF Tim OvERS.As CHINESE M SOUTHEAST AstA
(1966); and D. WxLi.io-r, THE NATIONAL STATUS OF TIlE CuINEsE IN L'qDONESA. 1900-1958
(rev. ed. 1961).
195. See note 180 supra.
196. For a survey and critique, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories about
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 227
(1968). The leading international work was P. MANC-NI, DrLA NAZMONALITA COME
FONDAMENTO DEL DiRro DsuTE GENrI (1851); a vast literature grew up around Mancini's
theoretical formulation.
197. For some hypotheses, see M. RFSMAN, supra note 13, at 81-82.
198. From the standpoint of international law, however, the racial claim is dearly
no longer accepted. See, e.g., G. Scu.LE, supra note 125. at 152-54. For a precise discussion
of the abuses to which this doctrine has lent itself and pertinent commentary, See
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Nationality, 23 At. J.
INT'L L. 1, 26 (Supp. 1929); Mallison, The Zionist-Israel Juridical Clains to Constitute
"The Jewish People" Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in it; Appraisal it
Public International Law, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 1050-60 (194). See also Y. ROCAT,
THE "ICHAMANN TRIAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 21 (1961).
There is some irony in the fact that the claim most comparable to the Chinese ethnicity
argument is South Africa's. On November 4, 1946, General Smuts argued that in light
of the physical contiguity and ethnological kinship of South West Africa with South
Africa, South Africa might legitimately annex the territory. U.N. Doc. A/CA/41 (1946).
The claim has, of course, been rejected by the international community.
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of a "race" to claim and enforce the allegiance of their overseas ethnics
and to claim the territory on which their kinsmen happen to live. In
addition to its incompatibility with democracy, racial suzerainty would
be quite pernicious in a world in which all races are widely dispersed.
Claims to irridenta in the past have often brought grief to all con-
cerned.190
The critical factual question is whether the people of Taiwan view
themselves as Chinese and choose to associate themselves with the
People's Republic of China. This is obviously a question which only
the Taiwanese can answer.2 00 Until they have been consulted, the
international lawyer cannot accept the ipse dixit of Premier Chou
En-lai on the matter, even with the concurrence of President Nixon.
C. Claims of Third World Imperialism
From time to time claims for the restitution of third world em-
pires in a selectively mystical type of self-determination have been
put forward. Sukarno's Mahapajit Empire, for example, was to include
Malaya and the Philippines, regardless of what Malays and Filipinos
might have thought about it. Comparable sentiments have of late
199. The limitation of nationality claims based on purported racial or ethnic grounds
must not be confused with the customary international legal right of quasi.diplomatlc
protection on behalf of ethnic, kin, speech and dialect and skill groups, for this Is a
phenomenon which is a necessary corollary of the very notion of the international
protection of human rights. Thus, the People's Republic of China might lawfully
protest and even intervene in situations in which overseas Chinese were subjected to
gross deprivations of human rights, in much the same manner that Western Christendom
intervened into the dar-al-Islam when Christians were allegedly being persecuted. See
generally M. GANJI, supra note 7. For discussion of the impact of the United Nations
Charter on the customary institution of humanitarian intervention, see M. REISMAN,
MEMORANDUM UPON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO SAVE THlE IBOS (1968).
200. The racial suzerainty claim is ultimately posited on a mystical volhsgeist which
dismisses both law and social fact if they interfere. Yet Chou's published remarks were
sufficiently ambiguous to create the impression that the Taiwanese were also citizens
or nationals of China. This is far from clear. From the time of the Treaty of Shimonoseki
until the Peace Treaty of 1951, the Taiwanese were not Chinese nationals, but were
Japanese. See Tameike, Nationality of Formosans and Koreans, 1958 JArANEsE ANNUAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 et seq. (1958) and citations therein. Article 5 of the Treaty
of Shimonoseki provided for a two year period after exchange of ratifications during
which inhabitants of Taiwan could sell their property and leave the ceded districts. "At
the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left said
territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed Japanese subjects." Note 87 supra.
When the deadline expired, only 0.16 per cent opted for Chinese nationality, Note 38
supra. From the standpoint of Japanese courts, the Peace Treaty sundered Japanese
contacts with both Taiwan and the Taiwanese. Even assuming, contrary to fact, that
Chiang secured lawful title to Taiwan, he could not impose a nationality on the Tai
wanese against their will, which would be recognized in international law. United States
ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943). Hence Nationalist China's Law
Concerning the Nationality of Overseas Formosans of Chinese Origin of 1946 is not
internafionally valid, as Professor Tameike correctly observes. Tameike, supra at 6.
The better construction would seem to be that the Peace Treaty's reference to Taiwan
includes the Taiwanese, whose nationality status will be determined in accord with in-
ternational law.
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been attributed to Premier Chou En-lai.201 Colonialism, however, is
not restricted to the domination of non-whites by whites. It is a per-
vasive evil in which any heterarchical group uses official power to
subjugate and impose its will on another identity group. The inter-
national principles and resolutions condemning colonialism are un-
equivocal. No Third World exceptions can be written in.
D. Claims of Self-Defense
Can China argue for title over Taiwan jure gentium as an essential
condition for its territorial defense? Sections in Grotius would seem
to support such a claim and there is certainly no dearth of examples
in diplomatic history for arguments of defensive territorial acquisi-
tion.202 Furthermore, there is a current doctrine allowing for a pre-
emptive self-defense which might, under certain circumstances, have
territorial implications.20 3 The claim is relevant to China, for the
Nationalist regime continues to threaten to recapture the mainland,
sizable Nationalist forces are kept on Quemoy and Matsu and, in
certain projected contexts, e.g., war between Peking and Moscow,
the Nationalist threat could grow in menacing credibility.
204
Although unequivocal cases are few, authoritative expectations seem
to be as follows: China may agitate to secure a change in the policies
of Chiang, but may not annex Taiwan by force. A precedent can be
drawn from United States-Cuban relations, where there seems to have
been a general acceptance of the use of United States force to secure
removal of the'Soviet missiles but total condemnation of efforts to do
more than this.20 Hence China's claim vis-h-vis Formosa can be re-
stricted to a demand for change in policy, but not for title.
201. See note 176 supra.
202. H. GRoTIUs, DE JURE BELL! AC PACIs bk. II, ch. 3, § 16 (1655). See also The Anna.
5 C. Rob. 373, 165 Eng. Rep. 809 (1805). But cf. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v.
United States) 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829, 854 (1928). As regards application of this doctrine
to maritime areas, see the dissent of Judge Drago in North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, 11
U.N.R.I.A.A. 167, 206 (1910); Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116; Gulf
of Fonseca Case, 11 Ai. J. INT'L L. 700 (1917) (Central Amer. CL of Justice). For a
general survey of doctrinal views, see Y. BLUM, SECURE BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST
PEACE IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 177-88 (1971).
203. Editorial Comments, What Weight to Conquest, 64 At. J. IN tL L. 344 (1970);
Y. BLUM, supra note 202. See also 2 OPPENHEIM (7th ed. 1952), supra note 76. at 432.
204. For a current comparison, see H. BALD vN. STRATEGY FOR To. sonoW 254-55 (1970).
205. See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J. INTL L.
597 (1963); Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, id. at 515: Christol & Davis.
Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated
Material to Cuba, 1962, id. at 525; Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, id. at 546; Fenvick,
The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or IllegaLP, id. at 588; MacChesney, Some Com-
ments on the 'Quarantine' of Cuba, id. at 592. For a survey of earlier practice, see
Wright, Territorial Propinquity, 12 Am. J. INT'L L. 519, 532-34 (1918).
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To summarize the recent developments, it would seem that the
international legal title over Taiwan is currently suspended; a per-
fected title vests in no state of the world. The suspension is a product
of formal agreement by a significant number of states, deriving from
the Peace Treaty with Japan and references, of varying degrees of
clarity, to the norms of the United Nations Charter. For the Com-
munist states, a suspensive effect is brought about by operation of
law. These states insist that title belongs to the People's Republic of
China. But since Taiwan is unlawfully held by Chiang, post-1945
principles of international law, operating intertemporally in this con-
flict, suspend this claim of title. The third position, advanced here, is
that sovereignty over Taiwan was suspended as of 1951 and will not
vest jure gentium until there is substantial conformity to contemporary
norms of territorial sovereignty.
IX. Contemporary International Norms
The establishment of the United Nations and the United Nations
-Charter have precipitated major changes in the international law of
territorial acquisition. In addition to the normative framework of the
Charter, the organs of the United Nations charged with the imple-
mentation thereof have also played a signal role in the prescriptive
process of international law. We are not concerned here with the often
logomachous question of whether organs such as the Security Council,
the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice "make"
international law or merely "declare" law which has already been
customarily made. The frequency and intensity of the reiteration of
the principles which we will discuss indicate, without regard to their
origin, that they constitute basic authoritative expectations of the
international legal order. In a number of instances, principles which
we have abstracted from practice represent specific responses to the
problem of territorial acquisition and sovereignty. We submit that
the specifications are innovative in formulation but not in content.
Virtually all of these prescriptive principles can be traced to the fun-
damental changes in international society which have been adverted
to earlier.
We note six normative changes:
a. The Principle of Non-Acquisition of Territory by Force. The
more traditional doctrine of the acquisition of territory by conquest
has been completely terminated by a prohibition of the use of force
654
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to change territorial allocations.20°0 This prohibition is one of the
founding principles of the United Nations and a working principle
of the organization. Further, the prohibition antedates the Charter
and was a critical policy for the League of Nations.2 07
b. The Principle of Self-Determination. This is a basic principle
of international law, given prominence in the United Nations Charter
and in a flow of resolutions by the General Assembly,2 08 whose ex-
tended authority for matters concerning self-determination is now
authoritatively recognized..2 00 The Charter proclaims self-determina-
tion in Article 1 (2) to be a major purpose of the United Nations:
"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."210
Though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is silent on the
subject, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
206. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reads: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." See generally M. McDOUGAL & F. FEcIANo, LAW AND
MINIMUM WVORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961); 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL Lw AND TILE USE
OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); R. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLI.E,'T WOR1.D (196); D. BowETr,
SELr-DxFmNcE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, (1958); CHrN & LASSWELL, supra note 2, at I04.06;
L. Chen, The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion, May, 1954 (unpublished
J.S.D. dissertation in Yale Law School Library); L. BLOOMFIELD, EVOLunION On REVOLU-
TION? THE UNrrD NATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACEFUL TERRITORIAL CHANGE (1957);
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law,
81 HAGUE AcAnEhiv REcuEL DES CouRs 455 (1952); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND Wor.LD
ORDER (1958); M. R1mssAN, supra note 6, at 836-59.
207. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONs art. 10.
208. This Resolution has been reaffirmed annually by the General Assembly. See, e.g.,
GA. Res. 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); G.A. Res.
1810, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 72, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1956, 18 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 15, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); G.A. Res. 1970, 18 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 15, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); GA. Res. 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14,
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); GA. Res. 2189, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 5 U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966); GA. Res. 2326, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 4. U.N. Doc. A16716
(1967); GA. Res. 2465, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 4, U.N. Doe. A/7218 (1968); G.A.
Res. 2548, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30. at 5. U.N. DOC. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2621, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at I, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2878 (Jan. 17, 1972).
209. Advisory opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South WVest Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16.
210. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter provides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well.being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development.
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and
international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
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Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
both adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, embody the principle
of self-determination in identical language: "All peoples have the right
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development." 211 The right of all peoples to self-determina-
tion was upheld by unanimous vote in 1960 in the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
21 2
and reaffirmed in numerous subsequent resolutions of the General
Assembly.2
13
It is no secret, of course, that the normative content of the prin-
ciple of self-determination is controversial.214 Without entering the
lists of the controversy here, suffice it to recall that the search of Tai-
wanese title has revealed that Taiwan was not historically a part of
China. At best, China probably exercised a type of colonial protector-
ate over Taiwan and its eight-year annexation was terminated by
a then valid treaty in favor of another Asian state with its own his-
torical and geopolitical claims to Taiwan. Hence, however construed,
the principle of self-determination will apply to Taiwan.
c. The Principle of Decolonization. Decolonization is now recognized
as an emergent peremptory norm, with very obvious application to
the case of Taiwan.215 In its landmark 1960 proclamation on de-
colonization, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
211. This is paragraph I of Article I of both the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS and the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS. The other two paragraphs of the same article read as follows:
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic
cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In
no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having respon-
sibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall
promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that
right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
212. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
213. See note 208 supra. Most recently, the principle of self-determination was given
prominence in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 123-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
214. For a large number of states in the Third World, the principle of self-deter-
mination is assimilated to the emergent peremptory norm of decolonization but claimed
to be inapplicable to the aspirations of newer groups in the Third World who may seek
some form of group protection from international law. See Emerson, The New Higher
Law of Anti-Colonialism, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 153 (Deutsch &
Hoffman eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Emerson, Anti-Colonialism]; but cf. Emerson,
Self-Determination, supra note 137 and references therein. For further references, see
note 137 supra.
215. For a detailed discussion of the peremptory character of this norm, see Emerson,
Anti-Colonialism, supra note 214, at 153.
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Colonial Countries and Peoples,210 the General Assembly declared,
inter alia that:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human
rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is
an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational pre-
paredness should never serve as a pretext for delaying inde-
pendence.
4. All armed or repressive measures of all kinds directed against
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise
peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and
the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Govern-
ing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained
independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those terri-
tories, without any conditions or reservations, in accdrdaice with
their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as
to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete
independence and freedom.
The Declaration has been reaffirmed annually .y the General As-
sembly.2 17 Indeed, the doctrine of anti-colonialism has become sucn
a crucial ideology in international relations as to be likened by Pro-
fessor Emerson to a "higher law" in international law.218
d. The Principle of the Rights of Non-Self-Governing Peoples.
Charter Article 73 imposes upon U.N. members who "have or assume
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government" obligations,
including progress toward self-determination and the assurance of
respect for fundamental human rights within those territories.210 Ar-
216. See note 212 supra.
217. See note 214 supra.
218. Emerson, Anti-Colonialism, supra note 214, at 153.
219. The full text of Article 73 is as follows:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the ad-
ministration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of
self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote
to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by
the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and to
this end:
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their
political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and
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ticle 73 was originally aimed at Trust Territories as well as transi-
tional arrangements for territories which had been under Mandates
of the League of Nations, but the express language of the provision
seems to have been clearly designed to impose international obliga-
tions on any elite which might subsequently "assume responsibilities
for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet at-
tained a full measure of self-government." This is the most reason-
able construction of the provision in light of the Charter as a whole,
for it is obvious that the world power process is a constantly shifting
one. Even if the clear language of Article 73 had not been included
in the Charter, the obligation it expresses would nonetheless have
been necessarily implied in the major principles and purposes of the
United Nations. A flow of resolutions by the General Assembly indi-
cates that this has become a general expectation with regard to peoples
who are de facto non-self-governing.
-2 20
In a factual sense, Taiwan is obviously a non-self-governing terri-
tory in that it is ruled by a political group which is distinct from the
rank and file, is alien to the island-state and has done no more than as-
sume responsibility for the administration of the island under interna-
tional arrangements. In the strict legal sense, Taiwan's juridical status
is analogous to Namibia's. Both are former colonial territories, severed
by world authoritative decision from their metropolitans after a
war, and both were subjected to forms of international supervision
delegated to foreign elites. In each case, the alien elites acted unlaw-
fully against the interest of the inhabitants and in contravention of
international responsibilities. In the case of Namibia, the United
Nations has already acted to terminate the unlawful occupation.22 1
In the case of Taiwan, this has yet to be done.
their protection against abuses;
(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of
the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free po-
litical institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
(c) to further international peace and security;
(d) to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and
to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized
international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, eco.
nomic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
(e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject
to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, sta-
tistical and other information of a technical nature, relating to economic, social,
and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively re-
sponsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.
220. See notes 212 & 214 and pp. 656.57 supra.
221. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). For
judicial confirmation of the termination, see [1971] I.C.J. 3.
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e. The Principle of Assembly Jurisdiction Over Non-Self-Governing
Territories. Non-self-governing territories remain subject to a con-
tingent General Assembly jurisdiction, derivable from the Charter,222
the general principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat223 and the recent
authoritative interpretation of the International Court of Justice in
the Namibia case.2 24 Hence the General Assembly retains a jurisdic-
tion over Taiwan. The jurisdiction is supervisory, but includes in its
sanction potential the competence to terminate all rights of the foreign
elite to remain within the non-self-governing territory. 25
f. The Principle of the Assessment of the Intentions of the Peoples
of Non-Self-Governing Territories as a Peremptory Component of
Perfecting Title. The language of the Charter as well as General As-
sembly practice clearly confirm that the ultimate sovereignty over
territory resides with the indigenous people, and that a genuine assess-
ment of their consent is a peremptory component of title. Thus,
plebiscites, to cite one mode, have been authorized and supervised
in circumstances in which they would constitute a reliable indicator
of popular demands. In contrast, in circumstances in which the level
of political consciousness of the local population was not deemed
sufficiently refined to render the plebiscite an instrument for mean-
ingful group choice, it has been rejected, and international supervi-
sion or even temporary dominium imposed.22
These six major normative changes in the international regime of
territorial sovereignty significantly affect the question of title to Tai-
wan. From them, several distinct and significant conclusions emerge:
(1) Taiwan may not be disposed of bilaterally, trilaterally, or
whatever. Rather, as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, any disposition
of the island-state must be undertaken under the supervision of the
United Nations. Furthermore, that body is obliged to act in accord
with Charter and customary international legal principles which re-
late to territorial acquisition.
(2) Even if Taiwan were not a Non-Self-Governing Territory, and
even if its status in international law were not undetermined, no deci-
sion regarding change in the status of the island and its people may
222. See U.N. CAmR, preamble and arts. 11-14, 73.
223. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174; Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151.
224. Namibia Case, [1971] I.C.J. 16.
225. GA. Res. 2145. 21 GAOR Supp. 16, at 2. U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
226. See GA. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16. at 2. U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); S.C.
Res. 245, 246 (1968); S.C. Res. 264, 269 (1969); S.C. Res. 276, 2853, 284 (1970).
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be taken without full consultation of the desires of the people. The
very purpose for which the peoples of the world have in recent years
affirmed and reaffirmed the right of self-determination is to accord
oppressed peoples the opportunity to break established political bonds.
In applying the right to give peoples in Africa and Asia their freedom,
it has not been suggested that prior establishment could not be abro-
gated in the cause of freedom. Under intertemporal principles of inter-
national law, the peremptory norm of self-determination militates
against a disposition of the Taiwanese people which fails to consult
their own wishes.
(3) Taiwan may not be disposed of without a meaningful consulta-
tion of the actual desires of the indigenous population. The plebiscite
is only one modality for this purpose, but since Taiwan's literacy rate
is one of the highest in the world and its political organization at
diverse levels is quite sophisticated, it can be argued that a plebiscite
there would be a particularly appropriate instrument for assessing
the actual desires of the people. Given the nature of Chiang's political
control, however, such a plebiscite would have to be supervised from
without to insure a real opportunity for free choice.227 Given its unique
relevance to the Taiwanese case, let us consider briefly some of the
possibilities and problems of plebiscites in international law.
X. Plebiscites in International Law
In international law and practice, the plebiscite has come to denote
a referendum of a significant number of the local population con-
cerning proposed changes in the status of their territory. 228 While its
basic postulate of the consent of the indigenous population as the
component of sovereignty can be traced back to ancient natural law
roots, plebiscites came to be increasingly favored only after the emer-
227. The absence of such a possibility in Namibia has been a major reason for re-
jection of the plebiscite modality there by the world community.
228. The classic and most comprehensive study on plebiscites is S. WAMDAuGIl, A
MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCITES (1920) [hereinafter cited as WAMBAUcH, MONOGRAPII], which
covers the period from 1789 to World War 1. See S. WAMIBAUGH, PLEBISCITES SINCE TIll
WORLD WAR (1933) (two vols.); S. WAMBAUGH, THE SAAR PLEBISCITE (1940). Though al
American national, Dr. Wambaugh served in the League of Nations permanent sccrc
tariat and was appointed as one of the three experts who drew up regulations for the
Saar plebiscite in 1935. See Hinton, Site Specializes in Plebiscites: Dr. Sarah Wambaugh,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1946, § 6 (magazine), at 24. See also H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERRMINATION
WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS (1967); J. MATrERN, THE EMPLOYMENT OF TIlE
PLEBISCITE IN THE DETERMINATION OF SOVEREIGNTY (1920); THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF IN-
TERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE SAAR PLEBISCITE (1934); Note, Causes and Consequences of te
Plebiscite in the Saar, 11 WORLD TODAY 530 (1955); DeAuer, Plebiscites and the Lea ue
of Nations Covenant, 6 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 45 (1921); Jones, Plcbiscates,
in 13 id. 165 (1928).
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gence of full-fledged political doctrines of popular sovereignty coupled
with the renunciation of wars of conquest after the French Revolu-
tion.229 The use of plebiscites has marked the curve of general de-
mands for democracy in recent history, waxing after the French Revo-
lution, but waning in the reaction during the era of Napolean and
the Congress of Vienna.230 Plebiscites returned with the resurgence
of nationalism and democracy after 1848, and "by 1866 the method
of appeal to a vote of the inhabitants, either by plebiscite or by repre-
sentative assemblies, especially elected, bade fair to establish itself as
a custom amounting to law."2 3
1
Plebiscites before World War I manifested varying structural and
procedural features. Those of the French Revolution and the Italian
Unification of 1848-70 were informal and unilateral, formulated and
implemented by an indigenous elite with effective control, and often
involving no more than a general assessment of the popular mood.
Other plebiscites were based on formal agreements to which both
parties, or states representing their interests, were signatory.2 32 With
or without formal agreement, all these plebiscites were executed by
only one party, which, in most instances, had established military
occupation in the area.2 33 In the informal and unilateral plebiscites,
of course, the state which stood to benefit by the cession possessed the
229. Invoking the principle that no change of sovereignty should be made without
the consent of the people concerned and renouncing wars of conquest. the French Con-
stituent Assembly in 1790-91 first insisted on a plebiscite in the ninety-eight communes
of the papal territory of Avignon and the Comtat-Venaissin before annexation. Subse-
quently plebiscites were held in the annexations of Savoy (1792) and Nice (1793). and
also in the annexation of the Belgium Communes (1793) and the Rhine Valley (1798).
See WVAMBAUGH, MONOGRAPH, supra note 228, at 33-55. 173-358.
230. The plebiscite was employed by the Italian patriots to further unification; it
was adopted by Prussia and the Germanic Confederation to solve the Schleswig question:
and it was reaffirmed at the Conference of Paris in 1856 in regard to Moldavia and
Wallachia. Later it was adopted by Great Britain in ceding the Ionian Islands to Greece
and was incorporated in the Treaty of Prague of 1866 between Austria and Prussia.
See WVAMBAUGH, MONOGRAPH, supra note 228, at 58-147, 370-937; J. MTrwqn, supra
note 228, at 80-96.
231. WAIMBAUGH, MoxocRAlH, supra note 228, at 1. The annexation by Prussia of
Schleswig in 1867 in defiance of the provisions of the Treaty of Prague and of Alsace.
Lorraine in 1871 dealt a severe blow to the practice of the plebiscite. The plebiscite was
completely ignored by the Congress of Berlin, probably because of the general attitude
of deprecation toward the political views of non-European "native populations." This
nadir persisted until World War 1.
232. Plebiscites in Savoy and Nice, Moldavia and Wallachia and in the Ionian Islands,
St. Bartholomew, the Danish West Indies, and Norway were all based on formal agree-
ments to which both parties, or states representing their interests, were signatory. Sec
WVAMBAUGH, MONOGRAPH, supra note 228, at 75-89, 101-22, 155-56, 165-69, 977-84, 1051-72.
233. The plebiscite for Moldavia and Wallachia was significant in that it uas the
first instance in which any degree of international supervision was exercised. Although
administered by Turkish officials, the regulations governing the implementation of the
plebiscite were drafted in concert with the ambassadors of Austria, France, Great Britain,
Prussia, Russia and Sardinia. The consultative European Commission was also involved.
See WVAMBAUGH, MONOGRAPH, supra note 228, at 101-22, 726-837.
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control. Where there was a formal agreement, the participant ceding
the area controlled the plebiscite process. These plebiscites did rein-
force the principle of self-determination but, unfortunately, failed
to develop adequate procedures.
After World War I, important procedural developments refined the
conduct and the effectiveness of plebiscites. They were, with one ex-
ception, prescribed in the Peace Treaties as integral parts of the peace
settlement, for renunciations of sovereignty over territories by the
defeated powers had been made contingent on the outcome of these
consultations.2 34 In significant contrast to the pre-World War I prac-
tice, the formal post-war plebiscites were all conducted under inter-
national administration and.by secret ballot335
In United Nations practice, the plebiscite has become a preferred
device for determining the future status of trust territories. Article
76 (b) of the Charter states that the progressive development of the
inhabitants of the trust territories shall be guided by "the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the peoples concerned." Though the provision is
not specific on how these wishes are to be ascertained, the plebiscite
has proved to be a particularly useful modality in the disposition of
international trusteeships.
236
Since almost all the original trust territories have now been trans-
formed, the United Nations no longer distinguishes the status of trust
from other colonial territories for purposes of self-determination. In
consequence, the plebiscite in contemporary international law has
been adapted to Non-Self-Governing Territories as one means of imple-
menting self-determination.23 7 The United Nations has also lent in-
234. See J. MATrERN, supra note 228, at 128-50; S. IVAMBAUGII, PLEBISCITES, supra
note 228.
235. Plebiscites were held in Schleswig (1920), Allenstein and Marienwerdcr (1920),
the Klagenfurt Basin (1920), Upper Silesia (1921), Sopron (1921), the Saar (1935). See
S. WAMBAUG.H, PLEBISCITES, supra note 228, vol. 1, at 46-141, 163-297, 411-84; vol. 2, at
3-107, 124-269, 491-539.
236. Under the auspices of the United Nations, plebiscites were held in British Togo.
land (1956), French Togoland (1958), British Cameroons (1959 and 1961), Western Samoa
(1961), and Ruanda Urundi (1961). All of these trust territory plebiscites were conducted
by the administering authority, but under United Nations supervision. In the British
Togoland plebiscite, a vote of 93,365 favored union with an independent Gold Coast,
and 67,422 favored temporary continuation of the U.N. trusteeship pending an ultimate
settlement. After the formal termination of the trusteeship agreement by the General
Assembly, British Togoland was united with the Gold Coast to form the new independent
state of Ghana on March 6, 1957. See YEAIOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1956, at 354.56,
368-71 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Y.B. U.N.]; id. at 372-76; Y.B. U.N., 1958, at 355.60
(1959); Y.B. U.N., 1959, at 361-71 (1960); Y.B. U.N., 1960, at 476-77 (1961); Y.B. U.N., 1961,
at 469, 475 (1962); id. at 475, 495-98; id. at 475, 484-94; Y.B. U.N., 1960, at 455,63 (1961).
237. See UNITED NATIONS, FiOz. DEPENDENCE TO FREEDOM (1963); UNITED NATIONS, TlE
UNITED NATIONS AND DECOLONIZATION (1965); Report of the Special Committee on the
Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. Does. A/7623 and addenda (1969);
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direct assistance in ascertaining popular wishes in other political situa-
tions. Elections held in South jorea were observed and reported by
United Nations commissions.2 38 The Secretary-General's representa-
tives were able to assess the wishes of the people in Malaysia (1963) 230
and in Bahrain (1970) 240 by consulting representative leaders of the
community and organized political groups. The United Nations super-
vised the elections held in the Cook Islands in 1965,241 and, in a more
restrictive way, in Equatorial Guinea in 1968.242 The question of
Algeria was annually brought before the United Nations, during its
war for independence, and a plebiscite leading to independence was,
at long last, held in Algeria in July 1962, based on the bilateral agree-
ment between the French government and Algerian leaders..24  The
United Nations also conducted a plebiscite of sorts in West Irian
though its unfortunate procedural pathologies were condemned in
the General Assembly.2 44
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and the International Institutions Asso-
ciated with the United Nations (Report of the Secretary-General), U.N. Doe. A/8314 (1971).
238. UNrrED NATIONS, EVERYMAN'S UNiTED NATIoNs 126 (8th ed. 1968).
239. 20 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Items Nos. 90 & 94, U.N. Doc. A15694, at 44,
320-21 (1965).
240. U.N. Doc. S/9772 (30 Ap. 1970).
241. GA. Res. 2005, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, U.N. Doe. A/5815 (196): 20 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Items Nos. 23 & 24, U.N. Doe. A/5902, at 2.56 (1965); G.A.
Res. 2064, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965).
242. Spec. Comm. on Colonialism, Report, ch. IX: Equatorial Guinea, U.N. Doe.
A/7200/Add. 4 (pt. 1), at 57 (9 OCL 1968).
243. The question of Algeria was annually brought before the United Nations during
its war for independence. In 1960, the First Committee urged the General Assembly to
recommend that a plebiscite be organized and conducted by the United Nations as a
means for carrying out the right of self-determination of the Algerian people. The
proposal fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority vote. A plebiscite was, at long
last, held in Algeria in July 1962, administered by France, based on the bilateral
agreement between the French government and Algerian leaders. The result led to
Algeria's independence. See generally M. ALWAN, AIcEa.A BEFORE TiE UNtTEDN NAos
(1959); Y.B. U.N., 1960, at 132-36 (1961); Y.B. U.N., 1961, at 97-101 (1962); E. BEan, TuE
ALGERIAN PROBLEM (1962); J. Kxrr, THE STRUGGLE FOP ALGRIA (1961); G. TnL.uo.n
ALGERIA: THE RFALrrmEs (1958); CENrRE D'ETUDES NORD-AFRCAINES, ANNUAIRE DE L!AFIQUE
Du NoRD, 1962 (1963); C. FAVROD, LE FLN Er L'ALGERIE (1962); M. LxuNAv, PAY.,S
ALGER IFNs: LA TaRE, L VIGNE rr LEs HosmEs (1963).
244. The complex precedent of West Irian is extremely important in the plebistcite
context and merits detailed treatment. The question of the future of West Irian (West
New Guinea), a territory administered by the Netherlands and claimed by Indonesia.
was considered by the General Assembly from 1954 to 1957, and again in 1961. The
Netherlands proposed a U.N. supervised plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people
in West Irian, but Indonesia insisted that the territory was an integral part of Indo-
nesia. When fighting erupted between Dutch and Indonesian forces in the West Irian
area, the then Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, urged both
governments to seek a peaceful solution to the problem and offered his good offices. A
preliminary accord was reached and on August 15, 1962, an agreement providing for
the transfer of the administration of West Irian and for the ultimate self-detennination
of its people was signed by representatives of Indonesia and the Netherlands. The agree-
ment was quickly ratified by both parties on September 20, 196, and approved by the
General Assembly the next day. According to the agreement, a United Nations rem.
porary Executive Authority (UNTEA) was to take over administration of the former
Netherlands dependency on October 1, 1962, for an interim period ending on May 1,
The Yale Law Journal
International plebiscites have also been conducted without United
Nations supervision. A case of particular interest in the present con-
nection is the plebiscite held in Outer Mongolia shortly after World
1963, after which the territory would be placed under the administration of Indonesia,
Meanwhile, Indonesia would make arrangements for the self.determination of the
700,000 Papuans of the territory by the end of 1969, permitting them to decide whether
or not they wished to remain with Indonesia. At the invitation of Indonesia, tile Secretary.
General was to appoint at the proper time a representative to carry out his responsi-
bilities to "advise, assist and participate" in arrangements for the "act of free choice." A
number of United Nations experts were to be designated to remain in the territory at
the time of the transfer of full administrative authority to Indonesia.
After UNTEA transferred full administrative control of the territory to Indonesia on
May 1, 1963, the United Nations performed no supervisory, political or administrative
function. Though the United Nations experts had been designated, President Sukarno
barred their entry to West Irian. Furthermore, Indonesia withdrew from the United
Nations. Thus from May 1, 1963, to August 23, 1968, no U.N. personnel were present
in the territory and the implementation of the second phase of the agreement was thus
frustrated.
Only on August 23, 1968, after Sukarno had been deposed, did the Secretary.General's
Representative, Ambassador Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, and his mission finally arrive In West
Irian. He discovered that the people there had not been given adequate information re-
garding the forthcoming act of free choice, and that the rights of free speech, freedom
of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the territory, as guaranteed by the
Agreement, had been and continued to be violated. At all times the population of the
territory was under the tight political control of the Indonesian Administration. Re-
jecting Mr. Ortiz-Sanz's proposal that the "one man, one vote" method be used In urban
areas, the Indonesian government insisted on rnusjawarah.
The consultation involved eight consultative assemblies, with a total membership of
1,025. According to the practice of musjawarah, all the members of each of the eliht
assemblies were required to stand up to signify approval of the consensus reached-S.c.,
to remain a part of Indonesia. Without individual secrecy, intimidation by surveillance
could hardly fail to blunt freedom of choice. Not surprisingly, participants voted unani-
mously for retaining the ties with Indonesia. With some subtly phrased reservations,
the Secretary-General's Representative concluded in his report that 'with the limitations
imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political
situation in the area, an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance
with Indonesian practice, in which the representatives of the population have expressed
their wish to remain with Indonesia."
When this Report came before the General Assembly in November 1969, It was
bitterly challenged by many African states. In their view, the method and procedures
used in the act of free choice were inadequate and the people of West Irian had not
exercised their right to self-determination within the meaning of the 1962 Agreement.
They rejected the argument that the people of West Irian were too primitive to have
a general ballot, for the same so-called undeveloped people in Australian Papua (East
New Guinea) had successfully utilized the practice of "one man, one vote." The rep-
resentativeness of the consultative assemblies was open to serious doubt because they
had been filled with either Indonesian government appointees or members elected,
through musjawarah, for favoring the retention of ties with Indonesia. This gross
departure from the prevailing "international standards of free elections," it was feared,
could set a dangerous precedent, particularly for the regimes in Southern Africa.
The representative of Ghana formally proposed that the people of West Irian be
given a further opportunity, by the end of 1975 to carry out the act of free choice as
envisaged in the 1962 Agreement. Though this proposal failed passage, it did command
considerable support. Even supporters of Indonesia took pains to emphasize that the
method and procedure used in this instance could only be considered appropriate for
the special circumstances of West Irian and could not be a precedent for the future. In
general, the West Irian case seems to be viewed as an unwarranted departure from an
important and intensely demanded international norm. See the Report submitted by
the Representative of the Secretary-General, in Agreement. between the Republic of
Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West
Irian) (Report of the Secretary-General regarding the act of self-determination in West
Irian), U.N. Doc. A/7723, Annex 1 (1969). For the Report of the Indonesian Government
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, see Annex II of the same document.
See also Y.B. U.N., 1962, at 124-28 (1963); U.N. IONTHLY CHRONIcLE, Dec, 1969, at 42.47.
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War II. Both the Soviet Union and China were parties to this pleb-
iscite and both acceded to the expressed wish of 100 per cent of the
Mongolian population for independence from China.2 45
In sum, the plebiscite has been used repeatedly as a device for ascer-
taining the most fundamental political demands of the people of a
territory. Occasional deviations or defects in plebiscite implementation
are inevitable in any legal institution but do not seem to negate the
usefulness of the plebiscite modality and its preeminent role in the
establishment of title in contemporary international law. The essential
challenge, as shown by the trend of past practice, is to refine the
methods and techniques of the plebiscite in order to ensure that the
245. The Mongolian People's Republic, a landlocked area of 600.000 square miles,
with a population of 1.3 million, is situated in the heart of central Asia. The SoviCt
Union lies to the north and the People's Republic of China to the south. The Mongolian
People's Republic coincides roughly with "Outer Mongolia," as distinguished front
"Inner Mongolia" as the terms were first used by the Manchus.
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan brought
parts of Russia and China under Mongol control. The Mongol Empire declined with
the overthrow of their dynasty in China in 1368. Subsequently, the Manchus conquered
China in 1644, and in 1691, Outer Mongolia was brought under Manchu suzerainty
when the Khalkha Mongol nobles swore an oath of allegiance to the Manchu emperor.
Under the regime, the Mongol rulers of Outer Mongolia enjoyed attonomy under
Manchu formal sovereignty. This oath of allegiance has become the basis of all suc-
cessive Chinese claims of title to Outer Mongolia, after the overthrow of the Ch'ing
(Manchu) dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China.
As Russia expanded eastward confronting Japan in the Far East, and as Manchu att-
thority in China waned, Russia entered the picture, aiding and supporting the Mongol
religious leaders and nobles. The Mongols declared their independence of Manchu rule
in December 1911, shortly after a successful Chinese revolution in October had estab-
lished the Republic. By the agreements signed in 1913 and 1915, the Russian govern.
ment made China accept Mongolian autonomy under continued Chinese suzerainty.
During the Russian Revolution, Chinese troops were dispatched to parts of Mongolia
but were driven out in 1921.
On May 31, 1924, the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement with China in which Outer Mon-
golia was referred to as an "integral part of the Republic of China." In Noseniber 1924,
the great People's Hural met and proclaimed the existence of the Mongolian People's
Republic (M.P.R.), and adopted a constitution in which it called itself "independent."
Shortly afterward, in March 1925, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs stated:
We recognize the M.P.R. as part of the Chinese Republic, but we recognize also
its autonomy in so far-reaching a sense that we regard it as not only independent of
China in its internal affairs, but also as capable of pursuing its foreign policy
independently.
U.S. DEPARTIMENT OF STATE FAcr BOOK OF TiE COUNTRIES OF TIlE W *oiL 455 (1970).
In an exchange of notes signed on August 14, 1945 at the conclusion of the Sino.Sosiet
treaty of friendship and alliance, the Government of the Republic of China agreed to
recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia within its "existing boundary," provided
that the desire for independence often expressed by the Outer Mongolian people was
confirmed by a plebiscite. When the plebiscite was held in Outer Mongolia on October
20, 1945, more than 283,000 Mongols voted 100 per cent in favor of independence from
China. Id. Lei-fa Chang, Vice-Minister of the Interior of the Republic of China. was
personally present in Ulan Bator as an observer at the plebiscite. The independence
of the Mongolian People's Republic was thus recognized by the government of the
Republic of China on January 5, 1946, and later by the People's Republic of China on
October 6, 1949. About Mongolia, see generally C. BAWDEN, Tim MoorN HIsroRY' OF
MONGOLIA (1968); A. SANDERS, TIlE PEOPLE'S REUBLIC OF 'MONGOLIA (1968); G. Mxtmtlv,
SoviEr MONGOLIA (1966); R. Rurax, MONGOLS OF TIlE TWEwTETIt CETuRy (196): G.
FRITERs, OuTER MIONGOLIA AND nrs INTERNATIONAL POSITION (1949); 0. LMrIMORE, NA-
TIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN MONGOLIA (1955).
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political desires of the population concerned are freely expressed in
each idiosyncratic case.
A plebiscite on Taiwan would present special problems. The Tai.
wanese are a politically sophisticated people who would not, as other
peoples might, find the disjunctive choices dictated by the balloting
process culturally alien or politically baffling. The problem of Taiwan
does not involve under-politicization, but rather over-politicization.
For several decades, an authoritarian government with an advanced
communications technology at its disposal, supported by the threat of
terror, has monopolized the shaping of popular political perspectives.
There are numerous indications that the Chiang government has not
succeeded in altering Taiwanese identity or political demands and
expectations, but has only stifled overt expression of these deeper
feelings. 2
46
The mere announcement that a plebiscite is to be held in the island-
state, however, will not change this pattern of repression, particularly
if the announcement is made by and through the government. Rather,
it will be taken as only one more signal to go and dutifully vote the
government line. In such circumstances, the entire purpose of the
plebiscite would be frustrated. In situations where the genuine desires
of the population will not be freely expressed, a plebiscite clearly
ought not be conducted.
The primary administrative problem of a Taiwanese plebiscite thus
does not involve the technical aspects of voting but rather the estab-
lishment and the supervision of a pre-plebiscite period during which
the alternative choices may be openly discussed and explored as a
means of providing information as well as dispelling conditioned
political inhibitions. Government cannot be dispensed with during
this interim, since the general requirements of public order, admin-
istrative services and external security will continue. On the other
hand, the Nationalist government cannot be permitted to use its offi-
cial power in ways which might attenuate the freedom of choice of the
people of Taiwan. A balance between these requirements must be
struck by means of international supervision. To this end, we suggest
a set of principles regarding procedures and operational sequences
which might be applicable to any internationally supervised plebiscite,
but which are particularly suited to the Taiwanese case.
a. After the passage of a General Assembly resolution declaring that
246. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1972, at 3, col. 5 (city cd.).
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a plebiscite will be held in Taiwan, a special Plebiscite Committee
should be formed by the United Nations General Assembly, to be
composed of prominent figures from other Asian and non-Asian coun-
tries, with a staff drawn from the secretariat of the Trusteeship Coun-
cil and the Secretary-General's pool of fact-finding experts. The Pleb-
iscite Committee would assume full supervision over all aspects of the
plebiscite.
b. The Plebiscite Committee would formulate the options to be
made available to the people of Taiwan, including resident Chinese
mainlanders, with sufficient breadth so that the options themselves
communicate in a secondary way that a real choice is being made
available. The formulation of choices must take account not only of
the aspirations of the Taiwanese, but also the political interests of
outside states..2 47 For example, by including in the options made avail-
able to the voters association with the People's Republic of China or
association with Japan, as well as independence or continuation of
the status quo, it would become somewhat more difficult for either
of these powers to denounce the plebiscite..2 48
c. The Committee would establish basic guidelines for participation
in and conduct of the plebiscite, including means for the dissemina-
tion of views and information. In the case of Taiwan, for example,
there is a special problem regarding overseas Taiwanese. Many of them
live in political exile but identify with the island-state and might
wish to participate. Provision should be made for them. Furthermore,
China and Japan should be given opportunities to bring their cases
to the Taiwanese people.
(1) The Committee would form a Subcommittee on Public Infor-
mation which would establish guidelines for campaigning and super-
vise their implementation on the island.2 49
(2) The Plebiscite Committee would also establish a Subcommittee
on Governmental Supervision to oversee police, military and paramili-
247. Notable among these outside states are the People's Republic of China and
Japan, and perhaps the United States and the Soviet Union.
248. See, e.g., Hearings on United States Relations with the People's Republic of
China, supra note 2, at 463-65 (proposal of Frederic C. Smedley). Another proposal
would place Taiwan under United Nations trusteeship, pending an ultimate settlement
via a U.N. conducted plebiscite. See, e.g., id. at 84-87 (testimony by Representative Patsy
T. Mink).
249. Equal time in the use of mass media would be afforded to all viewpoints for a
fixed period before the plebiscite and a rigorously even-handed policy would be followed
in allowing permits for street meetings, door-to-door campaigning and so on. The
procedures would include both direct licensing from the subcommittee as well as a
recourse of appeal to the subcommittee in circumstances in which a governmental li-
censing agency is deviating from the principle of equal time and fair representation.
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tary activities which might involve harassment or intimidation of all
or part of the population and thereby obstruct their freedom of choice.
The Subcommittee would presumably employ observers.
d. In cases in which the Subcommittee finds that a governmental
agency is acting in a way incompatible with the principles of the pleb-
iscite, the Committee should report a censure and broadcast it fully
in all the media. If the Subcommittee concludes that the government
or another entity is so abusing the plebiscite procedures that a free
expression of the population's will is being obstructed, it should defer
the plebiscite or return the entire matter to the General Assembly
for further instructions.
e. The supervised pre-plebiscite period would continue for a period
of two months, subject to extension by the Committee if it should
conclude that the purpose of the period-the dissemination of infor-
mation relevant to the choices and the establishment of a political
environment comparatively free from intimidation-has not been
achieved.
f. The results of the plebiscite would be presented to the General
Assembly. In the event that the Assembly concludes that no showing
was strong .enough for any one of the options to prevail, it could
instruct the Plebiscite Committee to conduct a run-off between the
top two or three options as soon as the Committee deemed it appro.
priate, but in no case more than two weeks after the initial vote. The
outcome of the plebiscite would be confirmed as international policy
by vote of the General Assembly.
This construct of a general, supervised plebiscite procedure does
not take account of any of the unique political problems which might
impede the operation of a fair plebiscite on Taiwan. Under con-
temporary political conditions, it is of course difficult to imagine a
political elite permitting an internationally supervised plebiscite in
its territory, particularly when one possible outcome might be the
removal of that elite. Yet, modalities for the assessment of indigenous
political will are necessarily implied in the human rights doctrines
of contemporary international law surveyed earlier, and procedures
of implementation must be devised to operate under diverse circum-
stances.
In the case of Taiwan, internal and external political pressures
make the possibility of such a plebiscite quite feasible. Precisely be-
cause the Chiang government has been discredited abroad and has
lost face at home, it may be attracted to the plebiscite as a possible
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instrument of legitimization or, at worst, as a negotiable component
in a peaceful transition. The critical point is not, however, whether
the Chiang government is at this moment enthusiastically in favor of
a plebiscite, but rather, how to conduct one in Taiwan. Thus formu-
lated, the problem becomes conventionally political, involving the
formulation of symbols and the mobilization of people and resources
in order to secure a power outcome. There is no shortage of skills
for this type of task.
XI. International Implications
The institution of title in any system of law is simply a cultural
and legal artifact by which a community secures the optimum use
of its resources in a manner compatible with fundamental social goals
and cultural postulates. If a title system works properly it accords
benefits of stability and high productivity to the community in gen-
eral and incentives and merit rewards to the specific titleholder. The
terms and conditions of title must, of course, vary with the context,
for there is no standard formula which can realize goals for all cir-
cumstances. Hence tide, in its broadest sense, is a process by which
the community allocates and reallocates resources among its members
in order to realize all community goals.
International tide, as our brief survey of post-war United Nations
practice has indicated, has evolved as an institution aimed at stability
of expectation, public order and optimum conditions of human dig-
nity. Of course international title is too restricted a device to bring
about a public order of human dignity. But, at certain junctures, title
decisions can contribute to those goals.
The Taiwan title dispute has resulted in a rare opportunity for
international law, for the lawful solution is plain and its realization
is unusually feasible. At some point in the near future, Taiwan will
probably seek to enter the United Nations. It is suggested that the
condition for entry should be an unequivocal indication of support
for the government by a majority of the people of the island. In the
meanwhile, the international disposition of the Non-Self-Governing
Territory of Taiwan and its people is the responsibility of the General
Assembly of the United Nations. The primary and most urgent task of
the world community is to guard against any unilateral or bilateral
attempt to change the status of Taiwan before the wishes of the Tai-
wanese people have been fully and effectively expressed.
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We urge the General Assembly to enact forthwith a resolution in
the manner of the Praetorian edict of uti possidetis, enjoining any
outside powers from seeking to change the status of Taiwan until
such time as the Taiwanese themselves have indicated their political
wishes. In addition to creating a useful precedent, such a resolution
would also serve to deter alien elites within and outside the island-
state who may now be conspiring to deprive the Taiwanese of the
right to self-determination.
Second, we urge the members of the United Nations jointly and
severally to bring pressure to bear on those with effective power in
Taiwan to permit an internationally supervised plebiscite as soon as
possible. This is a particularly propitious moment for such an opera-
tion, for the leaders of the present regime in Taiwan are at this time
in history extremely insecure and any acts which might reinforce their
status under international law will seem more attractive now than
ever before.
Third, we urge the United Nations to lend its material and sym-
bolic resources to implementing the results of a plebiscite of all in-
habitants of Taiwan, by incorporating the outcome in a General
Assembly Resolution and directing the appropriate organs of the
United Nations to lend aid in its implementation.
At the same time, it must be recognized that the shorter range pros-
pects for a lawful resolution to the Taiwan title question are not bright.
China has burst into the world power process, insisting on acquiescence
in its claim to Taiwan as a condition for intercourse with other states.
The United States, erstwhile champion of an international morality
of democracy and self-determination, has indicated that it will pay
the price. Lesser nations, many of whom had established contacts
with the People's Republic of China without betraying Formosa, are
shifting to the new pattern described by President Nixon and Premier
Chou En-lai.2 50 The entire changeover is being accomplished with
the neatness of a quadrille, mixing the saccharine strains of the rhetoric
of self-determination with the rhythmic pomposities of the Shanghai
communique.
In social affairs there are no severable, discrete cases. Every decision,
every choice affects all others. The disposition of Taiwan, as indicated
250. For example, the British government, reversing its long standing position that
Taiwan's international status remained undetermined, acknowledged that Taiwan w1as
,.a province" of China on March 13, 1972 in order to establish full diplomatic relations
with China. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (city cd.).
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in the Shanghai communique, will shape the expectations of all par-
ticipants in the world political process. A nation, larger than two thirds
of the states of the world, is being delivered by one giant power to
another because one covets it as a luscious prize and the other believes
that the transaction will ease the relations between the two and facili-
tate trade and cultural exchanges. The expectations thereby increased
will not be those of peace, but of increased instability, insecurity and
violence. What cannot be hidden will be explained as a political neces-
sity, a special case. Taiwan is, after all, only an island....
But in the interdependence of world politics, there are no islands.
The bell that seems to be tolling for the Taiwanese people is tolling
for many others. Whether or not they now realize it, at least two thirds
of the nations of the world have an important interest in the outcome
of the Taiwan case. Those who decide to ignore the Taiwanese will
share complicity in a gross international crime.
